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1. Introduction
This report presents the results of a 6-month study
performed at the request of the Advanced Development
Manager of the Advanced Programs Branch of Space
Station Engineering (Code MT) at NASA Headquarters.
The evaluation team consists of civil service personnel
and contractors at the NASA Ames Research Center
(ARC). The study was completed at the end of calendar
year 1990. Interim memos were issued as appropriate and
preliminary results have been discussed with the Johnson
Space Center (JSC) Work Package-2 (WP-2) civil service
and contractor teams.
2. Purpose and Scope of the Report
This report has two objectives:
1. To carry out preliminary evaluations and recommend
further analysis to assess the performance, dependability
and growth capabilities of the current Space Station Data
Management System design
2. To propose directions and mechanisms for evolution
and technology insertion
The Space Station Program and the design process for the
Data Management System (DMS) are large and complex
undertakings. Consequently the evaluation team chose to
focus on a few significant areas to achieve a reasonable
level of depth. The areas chosen were processors,
networks, system architecture and fault tolerance. The
choice of these areas was influenced by an existing base
of expertise and modeling tools that could support the
relatively short study.
The configuration evaluated represents the DMS baseline
of December 1990. A later report will consider the base-
line established in March 1991 after the scrub activity in
early 1991 mandated by the Congressional budget reduc-
tions. Documentation of problems using the older baseline
is still significant because many of the underlying prob-
lems will continue to exist in the revised configuration.
3. Background
The Space Station DMS faces several challenges unique
in the history of manned- and unmanned-spacecraft
computer systems. These include a 30-year life and evolu-
tion of the Station as a science platform and potentially as
a transportation node for manned missions to the solar
system. This implies evolving requirements for both core
(Station management) and payload users. The Station
represents a facility in space for multiple users instead of
a flight vehicle with limited capability for long-term
science users. The DMS must be adaptable to changes in
mission over a 30-year lifetime and must allow the
insertion of new technology as it becomes available. It
must also maintain performance and safety margins
throughout its life.
The DMS is the infrastructure on Space Station Freedom
(SSF) responsible for inte_ating information onboard. It
allows integrated data processing and communications for
both the core functions and the payloads. The DMS
accommodates crew visibility (monitoring status perfor-
mance characteristics) and control over the subsystems
through the Multi-Purpose Application Consoles
(MPAC), and it provides applications software processing
for all onboard subsystems. An interface with the Com-
munications and Tracking System that permits access to
the radio frequency 0LF) digital data links extends the
DMS data support role to the ground. The DMS concept
is based on a local area network of loosely coupled data
processing stations. Each data processing station is called
a Standard Data Processor (SDP) and is based on an
80386-microprocessor-class PC computer. SDPs are
connected to one or more local buses that permit monitor-
ing and control of the sensors and effectors used to create
a unique subsystem functional entity. Access to other
subsystems is done through a global fiber distributed data
interface (FDDI) network. The FDDI is an optical data
bus network sized to allow substantial increases in data
and information traffic flow as the Station evolves.
The overview of the DMS presented in this report was
perturbed several times by ongoing scrub activities that
caused continual changes in the design during the early
design stages. It is based on the charts and reports pre-
sented at the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) 3 (refs. 1-
6), plus documentation produced by various Resource
Board decisions and directives. Because of the pace of
changes and the lag in documentation, recent changes
(mostly reductions in scope) in the design of the SSF and
DMS are not reflected in this report. A follow-on report
will address the modified SSF DMS configuration.
4. Baseline Evaluation
The evaluation process was challenging. Scrub activities
resulted in constant changes in the DMS configuration,
which made simulation and modeling difficult. Test bed
experiments were hindered by the lack of component pro-
totypes such as the "DMS Kit." The DMS performs over-
lapping, real-time functions, and the modular nature of the
design provides many options for matching resources to
the functions. Therefore, any performance measure must
c_efully define the usage scenario, the hardware and
software configuration, and the function(s) to be
PRECEDING
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measured.Thus,it isanticipatedthathesearlyanalyses
maybecontroversialandsometimesinaccurate.For
growthandevolutioncapabilitystudies,theworst-case
scenariosa sociatedwithsystem anagementforthe
SDPsandthenetworksseemedtobethemostimecriti-
cal,sothesewerethefocusofourpreliminaryanalysis.
ToachievetheDMSgoalsthedesignershavechosena
numberof approachesthatarenoveltothespacecraft
computingenvironment:
Industrystandardbusesandcommunicationprotocols
Commercialprocessors(Intel80386)
High-levellanguagestandard(Ada)
Modern,commerciallyprevalentoperatingsystem(UNIX
variant)
Megabitsofprocessormemorywithexpansioncapability
Hundredsofmegabitsof nonvolatilestorageondisk
Programstandarddevelopmenttools
Distributedarchitecturewithprovisionsforadditional
processors
On-orbitreplacementofcomputers
Backplanearchitecturethatallowspecial-purpose
processors,memory,etc.,tobepluggedin later
Multiplexerswithspareslotsforadditionalinput/output(I/O)andcustomdesignboards
4.1. System Performance
It is difficult to deterrn|ne the adequacy of the system's
performance as a global entity without corresponding
performance requirements for comparison, but we were
unable to find any requirements. In the absence of firm
specifications, the best that could be done was a detailed
look at several of the areas that might be potential barriers
to evolution or be performance bottlenecks in the baseline
configuration.
Since the DMS is a loosely coupled group of processors,
it seemed obvious that network traffic might be an area of
concern. The baseline design is an FDDI optical network
with a 100-megabits-per-second maximum throughput.
Computational power, I/O, and backplane characteristics
of each embedded data processor (EDP) were examined in
detail to see if the performance of the flight version was
as advertised by the vendor. System and software services
such as the mass storage units (MSU) and runtime object
database (RODB) performance were also evaluated.
Relative comparisons were made with equivalent Shuttle
systems to establish a data point.
The DMS is actually a small subset of the total
computational power on the Station. In general, functions
that require coordination between subsystems or interac-
tion with the crew or ground are allocated to DMS
processors. The vast majority of the low-level, high-
speed, closed-loop control of Station systems will be
performed at the orbital replaceable unit (ORU) or
multiplexer-demultiplexer (MDM) levels. MDM designs
were not mature enough during the review period to make
an intelligent assessment, but they will be included in
future efforts.
4.1.1 Network performance-- The DMS Contract End
Item (CEI) specification does not require a deterministic
message-passing capability that can be provided under the
FDDI synchronous mode. The network interface unit
(NIU) design implementation has not been described in
sufficient detail. Therefore, it cannot be determined to
what degree it adheres to the FDDI standard. The termi-
nology for the ring concentrators (RC) conflicts with the
FDDI standard; there are no requirements for FDDI RCs
because all ORUs are "class A" stations, meaning that
they have dual attachment. There are two risks involved in
making modifications to this commercial standard:
(1) there is very little test data or operating experience
with the unmodified standard (none in a flight environ-
ment), so the revisions are being done without a solid
foundation, and (2) once the changes are made, NASA
becomes the sole owner of a unique design and cannot
take advantage of changes produced in the commercial
world.
4.1.2 Processor performance- ARC DMS and traffic
model simulations appear to agree qualitatively with the
preliminary simulation results produced by the
McDonnell Douglas Space Systems Company (MDSSC).
Each study utilized the baseline configurations and
workloads documented in reference 7. Overloading of
both the application EDP and the local 1553B bus seems
to be easily accomplished with baseline unit assumptions
and the best available sensor and effector traffic models.
An experimental evaluation of the performance of the
80386 was also carried out. Comparative tests were run on
a commercial IBM PC model-PSI2 with cache memory
disabled (the flight version of the 386 card in the DMS
does not have cache). Dhrystone and Whetstone bench-
mark programs were used to perform the benchmark
analysis. The programs were compiled using Gnu C on
the LynxOS, which is the closest commercial equivalent
to the flight system IBM is developing. Results indicated
a significant loss in performance without the cache;
3.1 MIPS for the flight CPU versus 4.0 MIPS for a
commercial PC product. The work package-2 (WP-2)
prime contractor and the DMS subcontractors have both
acknowledged the validity of these findings.
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WP-2selectedabackplaneconnectiontechniquebasedon
theMultibusII product.Thisbackplaneschemeisattract-
ingsupportasanindustrystandardfrommanyvendorsof
commercialdataandsignalprocessingsystems.The
MultibusII standardsupportsbothuni-andmultiprocess-
ingandallowsupto21communicatingagents,whichis
wellbeyondtheprojectedneedsoftheStationDMS.The
maximumtheoreticalthroughputofMultibusII is40MB
persecond,whichisgreaterthantheFDDIcapacity.
Therefore,it issurmisedthatheFDDIglobalringwill
becomealimitingfactortosystemperformanceb forethe
Multibusbackplane.
CommercialsupportofIBM'sMicroChannelbusisan
importantconsiderationt thelife-cyclecostoftheDMS.
A lackofmultiple-vendorsupportfortheMicroChannel
andtheIBMPSI2inthefuturecouldbecomeabarrierto
effectiveDMSlogisticsandevolution.TheMicroChannel
seemsasgoodachoiceasanyotherbusthatisavailable
now,withthissingleexception.
4.1.3Softwareservices- The Program Definition and
Requirements document (PDR) requires that multiple
copies of programs be kept on board in the event of a
system failure that prevents access to one of the hard disk
MSUs.
It is not certain how redundancy of data and programs is
achieved with the current proposed configuration. In the
case of a failure of one SDP, it is uncertain how redundant
RODB data is kept for recovery purposes or what its
impact on data traffic is. Also, if the SDP or multi-
purpose application console (MPAC) reboot mechanism
relies on a disk, a boot program should reside on the
booted system on a battery-backed-up RAM device or a
ROM device. It might be better for reliability and perfor-
mance under today's technology to have a single central-
ized disk farm with a high-speed controller device that
supports disk mirroring. The proposed baseline configu-
ration may have problems with initialization and
reconfiguration delays because the MSUs are shared
across the network and SDP operating systems will need
to load from them.
The performance of the RODB was evaluated recently on
the DMS Test Bed at JSC. WP-2 contractors at JSC
determined that in the best case, with the information
available locally and no application load, it took 0.43 sec-
onds to access a single data object. This is significantly
slower than what would be required if the application
used the DMS according to the DMS Critical Design
Review (CDR). Assuming the RODB could be optimized
by 2 orders of magnitude (or 100-fold), remote RODB
access would still take 14 milliseconds. Translated into a
rate, the RODB could handle somewhere between 73 and
233 read requests per second. According to the DMS
software CDR, a 100-fold speed increase would still be
insufficient.
As a comparison, one DMS SDP is compared to the
Shuttle's General Purpose Computer upgraded version.
Remember that there are multiple SDPs distributed
throughout the Station.
Table 1-1. The current shuttle general purpose
computer
Shuttle GPC DMS SDP
Memory
MIPS
Nonvolatile
storage
Language
Bus maximum
rate
0.4MB 4MB
1 3
34 MB (Tape) 270 MB
HAL-S Ada
1 megabit per 100 megabits per
second second
The comparison with the Shuttle is a good, although not
perfect, one. The on-orbit portion of the Shuttle's mission
is the most benign from a real-time-response point of
view; it is only this environment with which the DMS
must contend. Ascent and descent response times drove
the design of the Shuttle system (triple and quadruple
hardware redundancy with software comparison of output
commands). For the Station, the DMS is only required to
be single-failure tolerant.
4.2. System Dependability
The failure tolerance and redundancy management analy-
sis for SSF is focused on the functional requirements of
the inte_ated DMS. This analysis is based on a system
modeling technique called digraphing, which is currently
being performed as part of the design review process.
The digraph models for several critical functions are
currently being constructed and reviewed. The DMS
requirements are considered in this process so that the
design can be verified to meet the two-failure tolerance
requirement for overall Station safety.
The failure modes and effects analysis was documented in
MDC H4563. The focus was on two main modes of fail-
ure: (1) failure of the ring concentrator (RC) because of
power supply failure, and (2) network media failures
caused by breaks in the fiber and/or connectors. If it is
possible for an RC to fail as a unit, then FDDI standard
reconfiguration procedures after such a failure will result
in isolation of all nodes connected to it. This condition has
not been fully analyzed at this time. This does not mean
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that the DMS is only single-failure tolerant to this mode
of failure, however, since there exists a second network
path that can provide access to the isolated processors.
Also, the subsystem function assigned to a particular node
will continue to operate even if the global monitoring and
control capabilities are lost. Therefore, the failure toler-
ance level of the DMS varies with the type of failure.
These and other failure scenarios should be run on test
beds to determine both the sensitivity of the system to
various types of transient and permanent failures and the
operational impacts of the cold standby processor config-
uration for redundancy.
It has not been determined by ARC whether the safety of
the Station is jeopardized by the failure of more than one
SDP. The time required to bring up a cold backup proces-
sor might be 15-30 min. If a second failure occurred dur-
ing this period, the effect on the crew or the facility is
unknown and highly dependent on the failure scenario.
These are additional reasons for test bed evaluations at
both JSC and ARC.
5. Significant Findings
Although the studies and analysis for the DMS are far
from being complete, there have been some significant
findings during the initial 6-month activity. As is usually
the case, there have also been a number of areas identified
for further evaluation; they are listed in section 6 of this
report.
5.1. Processor-Related Findings
1. The EDP has 3.1 MIPS capacity instead of the adver-
tised 4.0 MIPS. This has been acknowledged by the WP-2
DMS subcontractor. This has a potentially significant
impact when the number of SDPs is reduced and multiple
functional programs have to run on each SDP.
2. Even the reduced EDP capability of 3.1 MIPS may be
further reduced when the full impacts of the POSIX kernel
and LynxOS are measured. Very early tests indicated that
the effective application software capacity may be down
to 2.6 MIPS. This estimate needs to be confumed with
additional testing at ARC as system software is
developed.
3. The upgrade path to a 80486 processor may not be
viable. The 486 has a cache memory but no parity or error
detection/correction code. Therefore, cache may have to
be disabled or an off-chip cache designed especially for
the Station application. These have significant long-term
impacts on both hardware and software systems. Com-
mercially available compilers and tools for the 486 pro-
cessor will presume an on-chip cache and must be
modified for the unique NASA configuration.
5.2. Network- and System-Related Findings
1. The Multibus II backplane appears adequate tlu'ough
permanent manned configuration. Projected growth
requirements based on data collected in PDR and various
management meetings indicate that the backplane selected
for the SDP is adequate for the core functions. Growth in
the payload support may become an issue in the future
and must be closely monitored.
2. Network simulations at ARC and JSC/MDSSC match
qualitatively. This successful comparison demonstrates
that NASA can now conduct independent parallel studies
and analyses of the DMS network and traffic patterns
between the various processing nodes.
3. There are detailed DMS real-time requirements. During
the review of the DMS a search through the various
requirements and specifications revealed that there were
no definitive requirements for real-time operation. There
are specifications for the DMS in terms of CPU speed,
memory size, data bus speed and packet sizes, but no
numbers for subsystem operation. The presumption seems
to have been that the SDP will be able to satisfy sub-
system performance requirements. A relative comparison
of the Station SDP and the Shuttle GPC indicates that the
presumption is probably correct; however, this needs to be
verified in test bed simulations.
6. Recommendations
During the 30-year mission life of SSF, significant growth
in user needs as well as computational technologies will
take place. Therefore, the DMS should be designed from
the outset to accommodate changes in functionality, per-
formance and technology. It should allow both near-term
growth and long-term evolution. However, the problem is
that system-wide performance requirements are not well
quantified, even for initial users, primarily because no one
has the experience to identify driving scenarios in which
the needed end-to-end responses can be defined. These
requirements could be quantified, starting with analogies
to a similar ground-based data management system, and
developed through test bed experiments with functional
equivalents that simulate critical Space Station operating
scenarios.
The DMS evaluation team recommends that NASA be
prepared from the outset to (1) conduct more analyses to
determine whether the current DMS software and hard-
ware can meet established and projected requirements,
(2) develop near-term plans for augmenting the payload
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support capability with minimal impact on the rest of the
system, and (3) develop a long-term policy and
mechanism for technology insertion.
The component development for SSF has been ongoing
for many years. Presumably, the requirements for these
components were derived from overall program require-
ments. As the design is scrubbed, the financial and
scheduling pressures on the program force a mix-and-
match use of existing component designs. Unfortunately,
the design requirements can no longer be traced back to
the original program requirements. Ensuring traceability
requires thoughtful analysis and considerable resources.
What exists for the DMS now is an Architecture Control
Document (ACD) and a CEI Specification that have little
connection to any definable performance requirement for
the DMS system.
It is recommended that a detailed comparison of the ACD
and CEI specification be made with the PRD. In addition,
a validity check of the final requirements should be
performed by analysis and lab simulations. These tests
should include development of worst-case usage scenarios
(e.g., reboost or Shuttle docking) that drive DMS response
time, network traffic capacity, and latency; they should
also include failure tolerance and reconfiguration
requirements.
6.1. Further Tests
A variety of tests should be conducted to assess the via-
bility of both present and evolutionary hardware and
software configuration options. These include real-time
(development and embedded) operating system mixtures
on present 386 processors with possible successor CISC
(e.g., 486) and RISC processors. The real-time environ-
mental requirements should also be experimentally
assessed. Local area network protocol comparisons should
also be conducted.
Many features of LynxOS still need to be evaluated
and/or fine tuned for DMS. These include memory lock-
ing features, default quantum size, task "dispatch
latency," and implementation of a file system, as well as
the ability of LynxOS to deal with the real-time functions
projected for SSF.
tive NIU and/or network design study is recommended to
reduce both development and life-cycle risk.
For meeting near-term performance needs, staying within
Intel 80X86 instruction set architecture (ISA) may be a
reasonable option because of the cost and time required
for revalidating DMS software. Therefore, the 486 seems
to be the most natural candidate for upgrading the SDP.
However, there are still concerns about the use of the 486
for the DMS, related to the 486 performance with the
on-chip cache disabled. The Intel i860 also looks promis-
ing as a (RISC) successor or payload processor, but
further tests have to be carried out to determine the cost of
porting code across different ISAs and communicating in
a heterogeneous computer environment.
6.3. Long-Term Evolution
The evolutionary goal for the DMS should be a system
that is distributed functionally, as well as physically. The
provision of separate networks for core and payload
applications as the DMS evolves would allow the use of
state-of-the-art technologies for the payload network,
while more conservative technologies could be used for
the life-critical and safety-critical core applications.
Based on initial simulation and experimental results at
MDSSC, ARC and JSC Test Bed, it seems possible that
the combination of 386 hardware and LynxOS software
will be i.nsufficient to meet the constraints of electrical
power as well as computational needs. During the pro-
jected 30-year life span of the SSF, the DMS operating
system may have to evolve to support parallel computers
and portable multiprocessor operating systems.
From a passive (read only) tap to the DMS FDDI core
ring, actual mission data could be fed to advanced archi-
tectural modules, performing mirrored functions using
source-compatible applications. This noninvasive,
mirrored capability would assist in the verification and
validation process of DMS upgrades before switching to
newer and faster equipment. A second ring (or crossbar)
network with passive taps to the core ring would also
allow for newer, faster, less power-hun_,_ry processor and
software enhancements, as well as for more advanced
fiber transceivers and protocols, over time.
6.2. Short-Term Growth
Local bus connectivity should be improved, both in total
capacity and in ease of adaptation to general interelement
communication. Early development of the 802.4H proto-
col interface and distribution of the fiber optic media to all
hardware racks is recommended. Furthermore, an alterna-
7. Summary
The Information Sciences Division at the NASA Ames
Research Center has completed a 6-month study of por-
tions of the Space Station Freedom Data Management
System (DMS). This study looked at the present capabili-
ties and future growth potential of the DMS, and the
results are documented in this report. Issues have been
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raisedthatwerediscussed with the appropriate Johnson
Space Center (JSC) management and Work Package-2
contractor organizations. Areas requiring additional study
have been identified and suggestions for long-term
upgrades have been proposed. This activity has allowed
the Ames personnel to develop a rapport with the JSC
civil service and contractor teams that does permit an
independent check and balance technique for the DMS.
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SPACE STATION FREEDOM DATA MANAGEMENT SYSTEM GROWTH
AND EVOLUTION REPORT

1. Introduction
Space Station Freedom (SSF) will represent a new genera-
tion of NASA flight missions--a departure from the tradi-
tional modes of operation. At one end of the spectrum,
NASA missions, such as those conducted by the Shuttle,
have been somewhat repetitive and of short duration. This
has led to an operational practice of performing repairs
and upgrades on the wound between missions during
vehicle refurbishment. Changing scientific objectives for
different missions were accommodated by replacing
equipment and payloads on the ground. At the other
extreme, NASA has launched and operated numerous
long-duration unmanned spacecraft. Relying on highly
redundant hardware design and the flexibility afforded by
reprogrammable software systems, the vast majority of
these missions have succeeded and demonstrated a degree
of mission adaptability.
Space Station Freedom is a radical departure from either
way of doing business. It will have a lifespan exceeding
that of the longest lived deep-spacecraft, and will need to
adapt its mission and science objectives to meet the
changing needs of the space and science communities. It
is essential that the ability to adapt be built into the
Station design before the first element launch.
The beating heart and central nervous system of SSF is its
Data Management System (DMS). The assembly, initial
capability and evolutionary growth of the entire Station is
critically dependent on the capabilities of the DMS, both
its initial configuration and its ability to grow to support
the changing needs of SSF during its 30-year life.
1.1. The Role of the Data Management System
The DMS is a key element of SSF. The challenging role
of the DMS is to support 30 years of continually changing
data processing and networking needs, using a design
based on today's proven technology.
The DMS will support the day-to-day needs of various
on-orbit avionic systems such as the Operations Manage-
ment System (OMS), Communications and Tracking
System (CTS), Thermal Control System (TCS), Environ-
mental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS),
Electrical Power System (EPS) and Guidance, Navigation
and Control System (GN&C). The crew will use the DMS
to interact with core subsystems and payloads. At Perma-
nent Manned Configuration (PMC), it should be capable
of supporting additional automation and robotics (A&R)
functions to minimize intra- and extravehicular activities
OVA and EVA).
The SSF program also includes the wound control
facilities, crew training and payload operation centers. It
uses other NASA capabilities such as the Tracking and
Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) and the ground
wide-area data network (WAN). The DMS responds to
mission control commands and experimenters through
these communication links.
In order to support productive, safe operations in a
changing environment, operations management should
evolve to keep pace with changing science and engineer-
ing objectives; thus the requirements for DMS will also
have to evolve. The top-level Program Requirements
Documents (PRD) outline a strategy for dealing with this
continual growth by including in the onboard operations
requirements not only mission operations, but also
planning, maintenance and training. This implies that
during increments of growth, the DMS should support the
immediate mission operations and the inte_ation, testing
and verification of a new core system (hardware and
software), and should assist in maintaining all within safe
operating envelopes.
1.2. Purpose of this Report
This report was prepared with two objectives in mind:
1. To carry out preliminary evaluations and recommend
further tests to assess the performance, dependability and
growth capabilities of the current DMS design
2. To propose directions and mechanisms for evolution
and for technology insertion
1.2.1. Baseline evaluation- In order to minimize program
risk and development costs from the outset, NASA has
selected a specific set of design elements to optimize the
use of common hardware and provide industry standard
component capability for both core and payload users
(ref. 8). These elements were, at the time of selection,
considered modern; widely-used; commercial, off-the-
shelf (COTS) industry/technology standards. Although
individual processor and networking components are
widely used in today's commercial marketplace, they
have not been integrated into a working system for a real-
time, spaceborne, fault-tolerant environment.
The primary baseline evaluation question, then, is whether
the present DMS configuration can fulfill its role at each
stage of the program, from construction to Permanently
Manned Configuration (PMC) and Assembly Complete
(AC) configurations. Furthermore, NASA should quickly
determine if these components will accommodate suffi-
cient expansibility to deal with the fault-tolerance, per-
formance and functional evolution needs that will increase
throughout SSF's 30-year life span.
Three major aspects of the DMS were evaluated: perfor-
mance, dependability and limitations. First, the DMS's
abilitytomeet real-time processing and communication
deadlines, and current and potential bottlenecks, were
evaluated. Second, to meet SSF's requirements for failure
tolerance, DMS reconfiguration ability in response to
node failure was analyzed. Third, architectural issues that
hinder or prohibit technology insertion were identified.
These preliminary analyses pointed to further tests that
should be carded out as hardware and software prototypes
become available.
1,2.2, Directions and mechanisms for growth and
evolution- The present design of DMS hardware and
software components should be perceived as only the first
rung in a 30-year-long ladder of improvements in SSF
computational capabilities. These capabilities should be
designed, from the outset, to grow with the expanding
needs and technological developments during the full
lifespan of SSF. The DMS items that should evolve
during SSF's lifetime are identified in section 2 of this
report; the choice of items was based on the baseline
evaluation. Candidates for growth, their associated costs
and impact on performance and dependability will also be
discussed. These recommendations will be further trans-
lated into (I) design accommodations required for DMS
evolution, and (2) a scenario for DMS evolution and
technology insertion.
2. Requirements for DMS Growth and
Evolution
The 30-year life of the SSF will see many changes. With
the baseline design of the DMS as a foundation, evolu-
tionary systems will be added to provide and enable
incorporation of additional functions and advanced capa-
bilities. A number of candidate functions were identified
in reference 9. This section reflects a number of findings
of that report and has been influenced by other SSF
studies. Supporting requirements presented herein are
based on a study carded out at ARC (ref. 10). Appendix C
presents excerpts from this study.
2.1 Integration of Subsystem Elements and Operations
The current DMS hardware and software architecture
treats each subsystem as a relatively self-sufficient unit;
together, they form a loose collection of systems. This
design maintains a basic level of independence of
elements and operations but tends to preclude further
integration in the future. The incorporation of new tech-
nology in tightly coupled distributed computers, parallel
computing, and pooled sparing would allow more
efficient use of existing computer resources and would
minimize weight and power requirements, both short-term
and long-term. The DMS architecture must be flexible
enough to incorporate such technology as it matures.
2.2. Instrumentation and Sensor Reconfiguration
The optimal placement of sensors used for control and
diagnosis on complex structures like SSF is still an area of
research. It is expected that the optimal configuration will
change after experience with controlling and monitoring
SSF has accumulated for a few years. This is especially
true in systems for which there are plans for future
automation. For example, a monitoring system using
model-based reasoning may use fewer sensors placed at
different locations and still reliably yield the same results
as a conventional system. The architecture of the DMS
must be sufficiently flexible to allow adjustments in the
number and use of the sensors and effectors in each of the
distributed systems.
2.3. Subsystem Status Monitoring and Fault Detection
The ability of the OMS application software to monitor
subsystems and provide fault detection, isolation, and
recovery (FDIR) assistance is determined by the design of
hierarchical levels of fault containment from the orbital
replacement unit (ORU) level to the integrated system
level. Functional alternatives must be incorporated into
the hardware and software design that will allow dynamic
monitoring and reconfiguration when failures occur.
Reliable intersystem communication of status information
is imperative for fault management at the systems level.
This includes timely communication of subsystem status
even during reconfiguration of the optical network.
2.4. Onboard, Automated Element Test and
Verification
Space Station Freedom will have a maintenance and
repair logistics control problem not faced by previous
NASA spacecraft. It will carry onboard a set of spare
parts that must be in good working order at all times.
Locating and testing this equipment could consume a
major portion of crew IVA and EVA time, In addition,
revision data on each spare part should be closely tracked
to ensure the part's compatibility with new kinds of parts
on SSF. Although this can be done for ground-based
systems, the data should also be checked frequently
onboard. Automating this task is well within current
technology, given that sufficient computing power is
available onboard.
2.5. Inventory Management Requirements
Inventory management will be significantly different for
SSF than it has been for the Space Shuttles. Every item,
consumables and nonconsumables, should be tracked for
both usage and change in location. Current plans are crew
intensive and require manual tracking and data recording.
This function could be automated with current computer
technology and programming methodology.
2.6. Onboard Training Needs
The training situation will be markedly different from
NASA's current experience in manned space flight. At
present, astronauts are extensively trained for every
contingency possible on a short-duration mission. For
SSF, the length of stay will be too long, and the contin-
gencies too varied, to permit exhaustive saturation
training. Astronauts should have training-assistance tools
onboard to keep their skills sharp and to provide prompt-
ing when a seldom-used procedure is involved. These
requirements for in-flight training will increase signifi-
cantly as the number of crew members increases and as
the payloads, missions, and configuration change over
time. Irrespective of the complexity of the system, l the
DMS should be able to provide sufficient computing
power to accommodate these needs as specific require-
ments for onboard training are identified.
2.7. Payloads and Payload Operations
The science needs of SSF will evolve over time. The
requirements to support growing and changing science
demands must be recognized and facilitated in the SSF
design. The primary requirement for science is the
capability to collect and pass on to the principle investiga-
tors massive amounts of data. Traditionally, raw (unpro-
cessed) data is simply telemetered down. Such is the
design for SSF. With no capabilities allocated for
additional onboard processing of data, valuable science
data will eventually either flood the investigators or be
discarded because of communication bandwidth and
onboard storage limitations. Furthermore, many onboard
housekeeping systems are also to be monitored and
controlled by telemetry and commands sent through
TDRSS. All this causes a contention for the downlink that
has already been recognized by other space projects. The
DMS should also be able to accommodate the removal
and installation of payloads, any change in payload
I The complexity of the system could range from a
straightforward advisory expert system with information on each
system element, to an interactive system that provides facilities
for online teaching and testing of astronaut skills.
handling procedures, and increased data processing and
storage needs. The DMS should have the capacity to
eventually support significant payload processing
onboard, or valuable data may be lost.
2.8. EVA/IVA Requirements for Maintenance
The external maintenance task team (EM'I'F) (i.e., the
Fisher-Price Report) established that the extravehicular
maintenance requirements of SSF over its lifetime could
alone easily overwhelm the available EVA resources
(ref. 11). Two interdependent means of preventing such
an oversubscription have been recommended:
1. Increase the use of telerobotics for external activities
2. Increase the level .of automation for many housekeeping
and bookkeeping functions currently assigned to the crew
Although a wide variety of time- and labor-saving activi-
ties are within today's software technology capability, the
initial configuration of the DMS does not implement all of
them. The DMS should be expandable to allow a higher
level of automated assistance to the crew in performing
IVA housekeeping and subsystem maintenance tasks.
2.9 Advanced Automation Capabilities
Many of the advanced automation capabilities being
developed to support various activities on SSF focus on
some type of FDIR. Three advanced automation projects
targeted for implementation on the SSF are Automated
ECLSS, Power Management and Distribution (PMAD),
and Advanced Automation Network Monitoring System
(AANMS). Information about each of these programs is
included in Appendix C. Since the computational capabili-
ties requested for these programs far exceed the
capabilities allocated by the DMS, end functionality was
scaled back and a future need for additional capability
was noted (ref. 10).
3. Design Overview
3.1. Assumptions
The overview of the DMS presented in this section is
based on the information presented at PDR3 (refs. I-6),
plus documentation produced by various Program board
decisions and directives. Because of the pace of changes
and the lag in documentation, recent changes (mostly
reductions in scope) in the design are not reflected in this
report. The configuration evaluated represents the DMS
baseline of December 1990. A later report will consider
thebaselinestablishedafterthefirst quarter of 1991
scrub activity.
3.2. The Data Management System Overview
The DMS is the subsystem in SSF responsible for
integrating information onboard. It provides integrated
data processing and communications for both the core
functions and the payloads. Via the multi-purpose applica-
tion consoles (MPAC), the DMS provides the crew with
visibility and control for operating modes (nominal and
abnormal). It also provides an interface to virtually all
other subsystems onboard, including the CTS, which links
the digital data to the ground. The DMS concept is based
on a local area network of loosely coupled data-
processing stations. Growth and evolution is based On
giving the DMS optical network an initial high capacity
plus the ability to add computing elements incrementally
subject to the available weight, power, and volume of the
evolving SSF.
As shown in figure 3-1, the baseline hardware design (for
PMC) nominally consists of 17 standard data processors
(SDP), 2 mass storage units (MSU), 7 MPACs,
63 multiplexer-demultiplexers (MDM), and their com-
munication links: the DMS Optical Network, local buses,
and high-rate links (HRL) (only to provide more payload
telemetry capacity to the ground). Each functional
component is built into one of a small number of chassis
that are ORUs with two standard backplane buses
(Multibus II and MicroChannel), standard interfaces to
networks and buses as appropriate, and standard connec-
tions to power input and thermal sinks. The communica-
tion networks and buses in the DMS conform to popular
standards appropriate to their rates: 1553B (1 Mbps),
802.4 (10 Mbps), FDDI (100 Mbps), and the passive
fiber-optic cable and patch panel for HRLs. The DMS
also includes the Emergency Monitor and Distribution
System (EMADS), which is purposely independent of the
DMS network, and the Time Generation Unit (TGU) and
Time Distribution Bus (TDB).
The AC version of the hardware design is shown in
figure 3-2; it will have the same physical interfaces that
are installed and tested at PMC. The primary hardware
differences will be the number of active functional
components. The network and buses are reconfigurable
starting at PMC using one of two patch panels. The media
for the I-IRL, FDDI, and 802.4 links will all be installed
and tested at PMC and will be all the same type of fiber-
optic connectors and cable. All sensors for AC will also
be installed and tested at PMC unless they reside in a
deferred ORU.
One of the new ORUs proposed for AC is the Bus
Network Interface Unit (BNIU) to connect payload
MDMs via 802.4H to the DMS optical network. However,
a review item disposition (RID) is pending to move such
capability to the PMC phase, so it may be available
earlier. In any case, no change is planned for the core
MDMs. Another change proposed for AC is to double the
total throughput capability of the DMS optical network by
splitting the PMC configuration into two separate rings:
one for core systems and one for payloads. Each would
have their own gateway to the ground via CTS, but inter-
ring command and control would be provided via a
redundant bridge unit. A third change proposed for AC is
the addition of a link from the TGU to a Global Position-
ing System Receiver in the CTS.
The design for both PMC and AC configurations are
specified in detail in the DMS Architecture Control
Document (ACD) (ref. 4) and the Contract End Item
(CEI) Specification (ref. 5).
The baseline software, aside from individual applications,
has many modules that further define the character and
capabilities of the DMS. The Computer Software
Configuration Items (CSCI) include the following:
1. Operating System/Ada Run-Time Environment
(OS/Ada RTE)
2. Network Operating System (NOS)
3. Standard Services (STSV)
4. User Support Environment (USE)
5. Data Storage And Retrieval (DSAR)
6. System Management (SM)
7. Master Object Data Base (MODB)
8. Operations Management Application (OMA)
9. Interface Software
The documents that detail the functional requirements of
each item are listed in table 3-1.
3.3. Hardware Component Description
Table 3-2 lists the major components of the DMS, and a
brief description follows. A more detailed description is
provided in the CEI specification (ref. 5).
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Figure 3-1. Data management system configuration at PMC.
3.3.1. DMS optical network- The backbone network for
the DMS uses the FDDI protocol 2 to connect its compo-
nents. FDDI is a fiber-optic, dual-redundant, counterrota-
tional, token-based ring network with a channel data rate
of 100 Mbps. In a token-based ring network, a collection
of stations or nodes are connected by one-way transmis-
sion links to form a closed loop. Each node transmits or
repeats data to its immediate downstream neighbor, so
that information passes around the ring in a circular
fashion. A single token or special bit pattern circulates
2 FDDI conforms to the OSI reference model of the ISO, which
subdivides a network system into seven layers. Each layer
offers a set of services to the layers above it and utilizes the
services of the layers below it to perform its functions. Each
layer communicates with its peer or corresponding layer on
another node by sending or receiving a protocol data unit (PDU).
The FDDI standard deals mainly with the physical layer and the
lower half of the data link layer, the medium access control
sublayer. It also deals with the Station Management functions
for the physical and link layers; these functions are critical to
robust reconfiguration under failure conditions.
among the nodes. When a node has data to transmit, it
removes the token from the circulating pattern. The node
then transmits one or more frames while it holds the
token. When it is finished transmitting, the node releases
the token by transmitting it to the next node on the ring. A
set of timers internal to the node determine how long it
can transmit before releasing the token.
The advantage of a token-based protocol is that only one
node attempts to transmit at a time, and there is no inter-
ference between nodes contending for the network
channel. Therefore utilization of a heavily loaded network
can approach 100%. One disadvantage is that if the token
becomes lost because of a transmission error or faulty
node, no node can transmit. The protocol should be able
to recover from this situation.
The FDDI specification includes two separate fiber-optic
cables for redundancy. The second ring is used if the
primary ring fails. Packets circulate in opposite directions
on the two rings so that if both rings fail at the same node,
one long ring can be constructed by having the nodes on
SDf 1B t
\
!B 2
FDDI m
ESA j_
EMADS
12l
10
3 F/C
1 MDM each rack (lab) - 25
TDB
J
Figure 3-2. Data management system configuration at AC.
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Table 3-1. Software design review documents
Software Requirements Specification Software Preliminary Design
(SRS)
Software Test Specifications
OS/Ada RTE MDC H4189 MDC H4352 MDC H4545
NOS MDC H4188 -- MDC H4548
STSV MDC H4191 MDC H4350 MDC H4547
USE MDC H4192 MDC H4348 MDC H4544
DSAR MDC H4187 MDC H4353 MDC H4549
SM MDC H4190 MDC H4351 MDC H4546
MODB _C 1-14481 MDC H4354 MDC H4550
OMA MDC H4245 MDC H4722
Table 3-2. Power and weight summary a
Component Power (W) Weight (lb)
SDP 130 37
EDP-A 28 2
EDP-N 20 1.5
NIA 35 b 2.8
MSU 160 20
RC 7 25
TGU 50 37
GW 65 c 40
1553B 20.2 TBD
MDM d 35 26.1
LLA 3.8 1.7
HLA 11.0 1.7
AIO 4.7 1.4
DIO 23.5 2.0
SDO 2.5 1.7
SDIO 5.8 1.3
MDM USER cards:
1553 7.5 1.3
for I/O bus 1.5
for USER bus 1.5
MPAC-C 900
Electronic Chassis 250 189
Display Console 650
MPAC-F 1015
Electronic Chassis 265 199
Display Console 750
aAssumes 12 Meg DRAM on SDP/MPAC's
bWith maximum memory
cWithout Foreign IF card
dWith chassis, power supply, and controller only
either side of the failure logically join the two cables by
doubling back packets received from one cable onto the
other.
FDDI permits several levels of service class with different
priorities for use on the ring. The classes are synchronous,
asynchronous, and immediate. Immediate messages have
the highest priority and are used only in extraordinary
circumstances by the Station Management function. A
node need not wait to capture the token to transmit an
immediate frame. Synchronous messages have the next
highest priority and are designed to support guaranteed
access times for periodic data, such as times required for
core telemetry. Asynchronous messages have lower
priority and are transmitted as time allows. Up to eight
different levels of asynchronous messages may be
defined, with different priority levels and bandwidth
allocations defined for each. The DMS as specified does
not support synchronous messages. This has serious
implications for system-level fault tolerance, as will be
detailed in section 4.3.1.
3.3.2. Network interface unit- The network interface
unit (NIU) is shown in figure 3-3; it is an interface device
between the high-speed optical network (FDDI) and the
ORU host components (SDP, MSU, GateWay, MPAC,
etc.). On the host side, the interface is a Multibus II
backplane. A network interface adapter (N/A) card with
dual optical transmitter/receivers connects with the redun-
dam ring concentrators (RCs) that form the rest of the
DMS optical network. The interface adapter receives time
code on a separate electrical connection from the TDB.
The NIU contains an embedded data processor (EDP) to
provide, in addition to the time service, the full ISO/OSI
layered NOS services for applications software on the
host. The total power needed for the NIA plus the EDP is
estimated at 55 watts.
The NIU is required to provide bidirectional throughput of
5 Mbps for full NOS services assuming 2048-byte mes-
sages, and 10 Mbps with 10% of the traffic requiring full
services and 90% requiring only link (FDDI) service. As
shown in table 3-3, it is also required to provide four
priorities of message traffic of average and 95% delay
under "normal conditions" with grade #2 service (possible
errors and dropouts). In addition, the NIU should perform
self-initialization on power-up, built-in tests for the DMS
system management, and station management functions
for the FDDI.
Table 3-3. NOS latency requirements (ref. 5, pp. 3-256)
Traffic priority Mean delay (ms) 95% delay (ms)
Background < 80 < 150
Normal < 50 < 80
Expedited < 20 < 25
Emergency < 20 < 25
3.3.3. Ring concentrator and FDDI network media-
The ring concentrators 3 (RCs) and FDDI network media
provide the physical-layer connections for the DMS opti-
cal network, which has its link-layer protocol imple-
mented via the NIUs in the ORUs. Together, the RCs and
3 The term "ring concentrator" is a misnomer with respect to the
FDDI protocol and should be changed to avoid confusion in
failure analysis studies. RCs are a unique ORU aggregate of
bypass switches and optical regenerators. Because of the unique
design, the Station Management function cannot isolate a failure
to one RC.
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Figure 3-3. The network interface unit.
media form the topology of the FDDI dual-redundant,
counterrotating rings that support the instantaneous digital
rate of 100 Mbps. The RCs provide the optical switching
to connect ORUs to the rings when they are "good" and to
bypass them otherwise. The RCs also provide active
regenerators where needed to overcome connector and
switch losses and to maintain optical signal strength
within the limits specified. The RCs do not provide any
built-in test capability for fault detection, isolation, and
status reporting; instead, they rely on station management
in the NIUs for that function. The optical medium is
radiation-hardened, multimode fiber, 100/140 microns,
with a graded index of refraction. The modal bandwidth is
20f MI-Iz*km (implies 2000 MHz at 100 meters).
3.3.4. Standard data processor- The SDP is a general
purpose computer that provides data processing and
temporary storage for SSF systems and payloads. Various
configurations are possible via different numbers of
EDPs, different memory sizes, and different types and
numbers of interface cardson an eight-slot chassis
(shown in fig. 3-4) with a Multibus II 0EEE 1296)
standard backplane. The present EDP (shown in fig. 3-5)
is 386-based, with 3.1 million instructions per second
(MIPS) and 4 megabytes (MB) of random access memory
(RAM) for OS/Ada RTE, standard services, and
applications software. As shown in figure 3-6, the SDP
can communicate with other ORUs via an NIU to the
DMS optical network, and some configurations can
communicate with system and payload components via
one or more bus interface units (BIUs) to a 1553B local
bus (or a 802.4 local bus at AC). It can process time (via
the NIU) to a precision of 10 I.tsec, and will provide a
watchdog timer and built-in tests to support health and
safety monitoring.
3.3.5. 1553B local bus- The MIL-STD 1553B data bus is
a serial multidrop configuration constructed with shielded
twisted-pair cable, transformer-coupled to the drivers/
receivers at each drop. The data rate is 1 Mbps, self-
clocked using Manchester II encoding. Three types of
entities may exist on the bus: a bus controller, a remote
terminal, and a bus monitor. Only 32 entities may exist on
one bus (normally mostly remote terminals). The bus
protocol is command/response, with only the bus
controller able to initiate a command.
Under the command of the bus controller, data frames
may be transferred between the bus controller and a
remote terminal and also between remote terminals. The
bus controller allows up to 12 lasec for a remote terminal
to respond to a command and at least 4 lasec separate
messages (intermessage gap time).
Because of the sync bits, parity bit, and command/
response protocol, the maximum throughput of 1553B is
748 kbps for the maximum 32-word (64-byte) messages.
The throughput drops sharply with decreasing message
size, dropping to 210 kbps for one-word messages. The
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Figure 3-6. Schematic diagram of a sample SDP (SDP-4B).
latency is small and well defined, and it is relatively easy
to define faults, but the bus controller(in the SDP) is a
single point of failure for the whole bus.
3.3,6. The controller multiplexer-demultiplexer- The
MDM serves as both an interface to various inputs and
outputs (I/O) with the DMS and as a general controller for
both the DMS and its external users (see fig. 3-7). I/O can
be via standard sensor/effector cards or via unique devices
of core systems or payloads on the SSF. The MDM
digitally sends and receives all data and commands to
other DMS-connected entities via the MIL-STD 1553B
local bus. It uses the local bus to communicate to its host
SDP and via its host to other DMS components. The form
of the signal sent to sensors/effectors or to unique devices
is determined by the I/O cards or user cards in each
instance. Thus a large de_ee of (module) flexibility is
available as long as the I/O cards or user cards conform to
space qualification standards and to their respective buses.
The MDM processor functions as an I/O controller via
f'trmware provided by the DMS; it also executes user
application software (UAS). An I/O database that auto-
matically links to the runtime object database (RODB) in
the host SDP is included in UAS services. The MDM
provides general purpose, real-time I/O control services
including optional time tagging of input data, multiplex-
ing, bit packing, demultiplexing, and built-in tests for
health status reporting.
The MDM uses a 386sx processor, with 0.7 MIPS,
1.25 MB of RAM, and 0.5 MB of electronically
erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM)
available to users, and the 1553B local bus. An IEEE
802.4-compatible MDM is being considered for AC, but
for now this more flexible MDM bus is deferred. MDMs
will be available in three chassis sizes: the largest has
15 I/O card slots, one 386sx card slot, and one (386sx)
controller; the smallest has only 3 I/O card slots along
with the 386sx slot and controller. See table 3-2 for
I/O card type, weight, and power. (Power ranges from
72 to 31 w/unit.)
3.3.7. Mass storage unit- The MSU is a secondary mem-
ory device (magnetic hard disk) for bulk storage. The
MSU provides the processing, memory, and I/O capabili-
ties to service commands requesting the sending or
retrieval of information to and from its storage and to
transfer the information to and from a designated destina-
tion. The MSU can communicate with other ORUs via an
NIU to the DMS optical network. It provides processing
capability equal to an SDP and provides nonvolatile
read/write random access to 250 MB of formatted
memory. Data storage and retrieval via the MSU is lim-
ited by the access latency and transfer rate of its NIU to
the DMS optical network (see section 3.3.2). For crew-
initiated access, disk storage has been added to two of the
MPACs to speed loading of applications. (Local disk
storage has an access time of 12 msec and an I/O rate of
32 MB/sec.)
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3.3.8. Multi-purpose application console- The MPAC
(fig. 3-8) is provided in three configurations: fixed
(MPAC-F), cupola (MPAC-C), and orbiter (MPAC-O).
The MPAC-F and MPAC-C can communicate with other
ORUs via an NIU to the DMS optical network. The
MPAC-O uses the BIU 1553B interface to communicate
with other ORUs. MPACs provide processing capability
equivalent to an SDP. Each has card-level processing
units specifically for operator interface control and for
graphic, text, and video display. MPACs interface with a
keyboard, a trackball, and a hand controller. (MPAC-F
and MPAC-O have left- and right-hand controllers.)
3.3.9. Gateway- The GW is an ORU interface device that
provides connectivity between the U.S. DMS optical
network and a non-U.S, optical network or CTS for which
protocol conversion is required. The GW performs two-
way information transfer at a combined rate of 10 Mbps
for any traffic mix. The protocol conversion is performed
to a common interface standard at the network layer (#3)
of the ISO/OSI reference model. The GW also provides
an interface and processing for the precision time and
frequency information, and provides built-in tests for fault
detection, isolation, and status reporting.
3.3.10. Time generation unit and time distribution
bus- The TGU and TDB provide a precision time and
frequency source for all subsystems and payloads. The
TGU receives and processes time code from the C&T
reference and the Global Position System receiver (at AC)
to generate a baseline time and frequency reference data
stream. It also provides built-in tests for fault detection,
isolation, and status reporting. The TDB is an independent
bus using twisted/shielded pair wiring (Electronic Indus-
tries Association std RS-422A) that connect ORUs to the
time and frequency digital data. It is designed to preserve
a time accuracy of 1 _tsec.
3.3,11. Emergency monitoring and distribution
system- The EMADS is an independent function for
monitoring and annunciating SSF emergency conditions
that could threaten the life of the crew. EMADS is a
hardware-only system for backup to the DMS caution and
warning system. It includes sensors for monitoring the
emergency conditions plus annunciation hardware for
each condition and connecting links. At present the condi-
tions defined are fire/smoke and rapid depressurization.
Scarring is provided for atmospheric contamination. A
manual test is provided on each annunciator panel to test
(1) the station-wide hardware, (2) the power supply, and
(3) the lamp and tone generator for each annunciator.
3.3.12. High rate link and patch panel- The HRL media
and patch panel uses fiber optics to send point-to-point
digital data between payloads, onboard payload proces-
sors, etc., and the CTS. The patch panel ORU provides no
less than 100 ports compatible with the HRL media and
provides for manual reconfiguration of links for half-
duplex data transmission via passive fiber optics. It is
designed to support rates higher than those that can be
handled by the DMS. Instantaneous rates of at least
100 Mbps will be supported between any two points. (The
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Figure 3-8. MPAC mode/overview with MSU on network.
media will have the same physical characteristics as the
FDDI media.) No less than 8 ports will connect to the
CTS, and at least 90 ports are distributed to various
payload locations throughout SSF.
3.4. System Software Description
The requirements and preliminary design of these CSCIs
have been published by International Business Machines
(IBM) and McDonnell Douglas Space Systems Company
(MDSSC) (as listed in table 3-I). The commercial soft-
ware that will support each CSCI, however, has not been
identified, except the operating system. This section of the
report therefore concentrates on the Lynx real-time oper-
ating system (LynxOS), which was selected to be the
DMS EDP operating system. The Ada RTE and Network
Operating System (NOS) will also be discussed, because
their selection has far-reaching implications regarding
evolution.
3.4.1. The Lynx operating system- LynxOS is a Unix-
based operating system developed by Lynx Real-Time
Systems, Inc., located in Los Gatos, California. LynxOS
was designed in a "clean room" environment and is not
subject to American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T)
licensing terms and royalties. The primary features of
LynxOS include (1) real-time performance, (2) real-time
scheduling, (3) ROMable kernel, (4) memory locking,
(5) Portable Operating System Interface for Computer
Environments (POSIX) compliancy, and (6) contiguous
file facilities.
Exact specifications regarding the multifunction real-time
operating requirements for SSF have not yet solidified. In
general, a real-time operating system is one that has some
ability to respond to asynchronous, external events,
delivering a required level of service within a bounded
response time. This required level of service implies the
ability to support time-critical SSF application programs.
Unlike general purpose systems, real-time systems are
designed around worst-case latency and determinacy (or
predictability of response). A bounded response time
means that both the average and the worst-case response
times are deterministic. Lynx, Inc., claims that the average
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responsetimefora20-MHz,Intel386DX-basedcom-
puteris50btsec, and the worst-case response time is
250 [asec.
Standard Unix is designed as a general purpose, time-
sharing, multi-user operating system. It alters priorities
dynamically to enforce equitable access to system
resources and to optimize time-sharing performance. The
priorities of LynxOS tasks, on the other hand, are absolute
and under user control. The LynxOS kernel does not alter
priorities unless instructed to do so. A priority in LynxOS
is a number from 0 (lowest) to 31 (highest), with a default
priority of 17. This differs from AT&T System V, where
"nice values" range in the opposite direction from 39
(lowest) to 0 (highest), with a default value of 20. When
an event occurs to cause LynxOS to reschedule, the high-
est priority task is run until completed. If there is more
than one task with the same highest priority, then the tasks
are scheduled round-robin with a configurable time
quantum.
Lynx Real-Time Systems, Inc., claims that, depending on
the configuration, the LynxOS kernel requires 130 to
160 kbytes of memory for code and initialization data, and
can easily be placed in ROM. This feature is important for
remote real-time sensors or communication nodes. To
ensure real-time response and rapid interprocess commu-
nication, LynxOS also allows tasks to be locked in
memory so that they will not be swapped out to disk.
3.4.2. Ada run-time environment- The Ada RTE may
be used to solve some of the problems with the POSIX
kernel. The final selection of an Ada compiler is still
pending. DDC-I and Verdix appear to be good candidates
for this, but POSIX and the Ada RTE are so dependent on
each other that the final selection will have to rely on the
choice for the OS kernel. Also, the pending IEEE stan-
dards for real-time extensions and POSDUAda should be
considered if the goal is complete standardization. The
hardware will also play an important role in this decision,
The Ada RTE that is chosen should offer a significant
number of products for development of user interface and
communications software. Tools should be acquired to
make this easier, together with documentation and exam-
pies for writing device drivers. There may be considerable
lag time before these tools are available for interfacing
between the Ada RTE and POSIX or the LynxOS.
3.4.3. Network operating system- The proposed DMS
optical network is based on the FDDI link protocol
standard, so the NOS should be compatible with FDDI.
The subcontractor for the NOS has been selected, but its
detailed design or proposed characteristics have not been
available for review.
Details on the justification for using a lan_maage other than
Ada should be examined to determine the necessity for
this waiver. The network operating system will be depen-
dent on the NIA hardware and on the I/O bus selected.
Whether Ada or assembler is used for this will naturally
affect the ease of evolving the NOS.
4. Evaluation of the DMS Baseline
Architecture
4.1. System Performance
4.1.1. Evaluation approaches and criteria- The primary
problem facing baseline evaluation stems from the fact
that the DMS architectural freeze decisions have to be
made before the DMS test bed kit components and mod-
ules can be fully developed and integrated, i.e., before
actual tests on the full DMS hardware and software
complement can be performed. 4 System simulations will
have to be used at this juncture to evaluate present DMS
design. With constant change request (CR) activities,
RID, and scrub activities affecting nearly all DMS com-
ponents, the interpreted requirements and design assump-
tions underlying these simulations could easily become
uncertain and even misleading. Furthermore, real systems
are notorious for exhibiting hidden flaws that cannot be
uncovered using simulation. An additional problem is that
the actual avionics software (e.g., TCS, ECLSS, EPS,
GN&C, etc.) has not yet been completely designed or
coded.
The DMS performs many overlapping real-time functions,
and the modular nature of the design provides many
options for matching resources to functions. Tests for
performance must carefully define the usage scenario, the
hardware and software configuration, and the functions
measured. Thus it is expected that some of the early
analyses and results will be controversial. The system CEI
specification has very few explicit quantitative perfor-
mance requirements at the system level (see ref. 5,
table 3.2.1-1). Early analysis should focus on the worst-
case scenarios for a baseline configuration; furthermore,
obtaining agreement between the users and developers on
the details is as important as the list of assumptions and
4 Discussions with IBM Federal Systems Division, Houston,
made it clear that "Functional Equivalent Units" (i.e., non-MIL-
Spec, non-Space Qualified) kit versions will not be fully
integrated and available until mid-1992. For the flight-qualified
version of the DMS we will have to wait until mid-1993. Test
beds are of considerable value when they can provide enough
data to make key hardware, software, and application design
decisions. In this case, test bed equipment will arrive only after
the key DMS design freeze decisions are made.
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thenumericresults.Forgrowthandevolutioncapability
studies,theworst-casecenariosa sociatedwithsystem
managementfortheSDPsandthenetworksseemtobe
themostimecritical,sothesewerethefocusourprelim-
inaryanalysis.Thelatencyin receiptofremotestatusdata
underafailuredetection,isolation,andrecoveryscenario
isanexampleusedinmanyearlysimulationanalysesat
theNASAAmesResearchCenter(ARC)Advanced
ArchitectureTestBed.
TwoapproachesarecurrentlyusedatARCforevaluating
DMSperformance,simulationmodels,andtestbed
experiments.Threesimulationtoolsarebeingapplied
in-house:
1.LocalAreaNetworkExtensibleSimulator(LANES)
linkprotocolsimulation,whichhasahigh-fidelitymodel
oftheFDDIprotocolandaflexiblerun-timeparameteri-
zationofconfiguration,i terfaces,andworkload
2.DistributedProcessing/NetworkSimulator(DPNS),
whichhasahigherlevelmodelingcapabilitythanLANES
forsettingconfigurationsa networksandlinkswith
variousprocessor,memory,andsensor/effectoroptionsat
eachnode,andaseparateworkloadescriptionmethod
forassigningahierarchyofparallelandserialjobstothe
resources
3. An Experimentation Environment for Concurrent
Systems (AXE) workload programming tool (ref. 12) for
dynamic resource allocation studies, which allows the
most flexibility in defining configuration and workload
granularity.
Development of multiple models are planned with these
tools to study critical performance and design evolution
issues
4.1.2. Preliminary results-
4.1.2.1. The DMS optical network: The DMS
optical network uses the FDDI protocol. However,
because the NIU design implementation has not been
described in sufficient detail, it cannot be determined to
what degree it adheres to the FDDI standard. Technical
papers have provided characterizations of the protocol
performance (including some based on ARC analysis and
simulations). Because the protocol is complex and has
been only partially implemented in commercial interfaces
to date, its subtleties can easily be misunderstood. For
example, the DMS CEI specification does not require a
deterministic message-passing capability that can be
provided under the FDDI synchronous mode; a PDR1 and
PDR3 RID has been submitted to flag this weakness.
Also, the terminology for the RCs conflicts with the FDDI
standard (see section 3.3.3 foomote). Although prototype
DMS kitsare referenced as having an FDDI network, they
have neither the redundancy nor the station management
of the standard, and will not have those features in the
official DMS kit releases of 1991 either.
The intent for the DMS is for all stations to be Class A
stations, i.e., all stations are attached to both the primary
and the secondary ring. However, the physical connec-
tions within the standard data processors are not described
in enough detail to allow evaluation of "wraparound
capabilities" of the system. The standard FDDI physical
connection pairs a receiver on one ring with a transmitter
on the other ring. There are two such physical entities
(called PHY) in each Class A station, according to the
FDDI standard. It is not clear that the NIA for the SDP
has been designed according to these specifications. In
addition, some station management objectives that are
outside the FDDI standard are being defined in an attempt
to satisfy the system requirement for critical operations
with two failures. At this point, the development is at risk
because modifications to a commercial standard are being
made without any actual test data or operating experience.
It is possible for such modifications to invalidate all
claims of performance and reliability that are based on
analyses of the standard and to invalidate portions of the
standard that deal with configuration management. Insuf-
ficient detail concerning the DMS optical network has
been provided for us to evaluate the impact of modifica-
tions to the FDDI standard that have been proposed for
the DMS.
4.1.2.2. SDP performance and loading on the
1553B: Preliminary simulations of DMS and traffic
models have been run by MDSSC using some of the base-
line configurations and workloads; they were reported in
reference 7. Although a thorough review of the cases is
still pending, ARC simulation models appear to agree
qualitatively with the MDSSC results. Both the applica-
tion EDP and the local 1553B bus were readily over-
loaded under baseline unit assumptions and under some
sensor and effector traffic models (see appendix B).
An experimental evaluation of the performance of the 386
was also carried out. An IBM PSI2 Model 70-A21 com-
puter, which has 25-MHz 386 and 387 processors and a
64-kbyte external cache was used for the performance
evaluation (ref. 13). Comparative tests were run with the
cache disabled, because the current EDP specification
does not mention using any cache for its computer system
(ref. 14). The instruction mix and relative usage weights
for the 386 MIPS Instruction Benchmark were specified
in the Configuration Item Development Specification for
the EDP (ref. 14), but the benchmark program was not
available for this testing. Therefore, the Dhrystone and
Whetstone benchmark programs were compiled using
Gnu C on the LynxOS. The results, shown in table 4-1,
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showedasignificantlossinperformancewithoutthe
cache,buttheseresultsareonlyrelativeandcannotbe
directlycomparedwiththerequirementasspecifiedin
reference4.
Table 4-1. Performance of the 386 with cache enabled
and disabled
Benchmark Dhrystone Whetstone
386/387 with 7205 Dhrystone/ 1330 K-Whetstone/
64-kbyte second second
cache
386/387 with 3970 Dhrystone/ 1085 K-Whetstone/
cache second second
disabled
4.1.2.3. SDP system bus: Multibus II: The system
bus for the standard data processor is used for local inter-
processor communication between the EDP-4 processor
and the EDP-1 processor for the NOS. It will also be used
for other backplane devices, such as memory expansion
and the MicroChannel bus controller. The proposed sys-
tem bus is the Multibus II. This bus standard has advan-
tages because it supports multiprocessing and allows up to
21 communicating agents. The Multibus II backplane is
attracting support from multiple vendors for commercial
data and signal processing systems and supports a hetero-
geneous mix of loosely coupled processors.
The maximum theoretical throughput of the Multibus II is
bus for I/O, development of interface hardware and soft-
ware for the network interface unit and the MPAC dis-
plays can be expected in the near term. However, general
commercial support for MicroChannel is currently mixed.
A lack of vendor support for the MicroChannel and the
IBM PS/2 in the future could become a barrier to DMS
evolution. For example, if IBM should opt to drop
MicroChannel in its next personal computer product,
NASA can expect higher maintenance costs and evolu-
tionary restrictions.
Ignoring these considerations, from a performance stand-
point the MicroChannel seems as good a choice as any
other bus that is available now. Given a choice of the
extended industry standard architecture bus, NuBus,
FutureBus+, and Multibus II, the "MicroChannel [should
still] be retained as the local bus" (ref. 15).
4.1.2.5. Network operating system: The life-cycle
cost of the NOS software also depends on the selection of
the EDP/RA.M bus (MicroChannel). The selection of the
MicroChannel as it relates to the evolution of DMS soft-
ware is valid provided that the device drivers for the
FDDI network interface controller are commercially
supported.
According to schedule, the program will not get the first
NOS software for network interface tests until August
1991. However, as shown in table 3-3, a brief review of
the requirements in the CEI Specification (ref. 5, p. 3-256)
shows a serious weakness in the NIU performance of
timely fault management; the only latency specifications
are for nominal conditions and even then, only at a 95%
40 MB/sec, but if multiple agents will be present on the probability. If an anomaly occurs in the DMS optical
bus, test bed simulations and actual scenarios should be network, there is no specified time to propagate the status
used to determine whether the Multibus II will be a
bottleneck. For long-term evolution, FutureBus+ might be
a viable up_ade candidate. Based on initial indications of_
support from industry and other government agencies, the
FutureBus+ standard will probably provide a broad
customer base and strong vendor support in the future.
However, qualified versions of the FutureBus+ are not
available now, and commercial versions are not expected
to be available until 1991. Therefore, a study of the
feasibility of making such a bus transition is
recommended.
4.1.2.4. EDP/RAM bus: MicroChannel: In addition
to being the embedded processor system bus connecting
to other stations. This could make detection and isolation
of faults a very uncertain process at best.
4.1.2.6. Multiplexer-demultiplexer: The evolution-
ary constraints on the MDM are similar to those on the
SDP because they both use Intel's 386 as their baseline
processor. A more detailed analysis of MDM performance
is premature because of design and implementation
uncertainties. However, some top-level constraints associ-
ated with the MDM can be identified through the per-
spective of the Centrifuge Facility Project at ARC and a
review of the specifications in the DMS and MDM CEI
documents:
1. Sensor/effector service, as specified, requires a sample
the 386 CPU to RAM, the IBM proprietary MicroChannel rate of only 10 Hz,
bus has been proposed for the interface from the embed-
ded 386 and the NIA to the FDDI token ring and the 2. Throughput per MDM is limited to 22.4 kbps via UAS
MPAC display device. This makes commercial support of and 96 kbps via standard I/O cards.
the MicroChannel bus an important consideration to the 3. Although throughput is 10 Mbps at the host SDP-to-
life-cycle cost of the DMS. Since the IBM PS/2 uses this DMS network interface, the RODB constraint is not
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defined,andlimitations1and2mayleadpayloadesign-
ers to go around the MDM and the system RODB with
custom components.
More details of the payload interface options can be found
in reference 8; four options are outlined in response to the
Space Station Advisory Committee finding that the pay-
load interface is unclear, however the interfaces are
described as "still needing to mature" (ref. 8). The find-
ings and responses from the meeting are interpreted as
showing the need for more systems integration develop-
ment and more planning for future missions. In particular,
I. The cost for payloads to use DMS "commonality"
elements is undefined.
2. The 802.4 bus and MDM interface, scrubbed in 1989, is
needed by some payloads.
3. Even though the HRl../patch panel for telemetry is a
costly and minimally defined interface, 70% of the
payloads are being planned for its use.
Figure 4-1 is an overview of the Centrifuge Facility
payload interface scheme to deal with the DMS and OMA
constraints. It is a good example of payload interface
issues because it is a long-lived payload with only moder-
ate telemetry needs (no single high rate, total aggregate
rate 5-15 Mbps), and it is required by OMA health-and-
safety and command needs to connect to the DMS. One
would expect all its data processing and communications
to fit within the DMS, but instead, a dual interface with a
custom HRL link is planned because the MDM/1553
interface is too constraining, the 802.4 solution is too
uncertain, and migrating between them is too costly.
The current prevailing view (or model) of a payload
instrument also contributes to the dual interface; past
experience is with instruments for which all data is sent as
telemetry to the ground. Although future instruments
should be projecting the use of internal processing and
automation to reduce telemetry, today's model of
requirements is fuzzy at best, and a high design risk.
4.1.2.7. Primary/secondary storage: The current
baseline DMS configuration is a loosely coupled mass of
independent processors, especially with respect to mass
storage. This is a workable architecture as long as things
like automated central control, system management,
reconfiguration, and fault management are not required.
However, these features are part of the DMS proposal and
the- would require at least an evolutionary path to a truly
distributed system with high communications bandwidth
and elimination of bottlenecks. In a distributed configura-
tion, fully redundant primary and secondary storage sys-
tems are at least desirable and in the case of fault manage-
ment, particularly necessary. The CEI Specification
requires redundant copies of all critical software and data.
The DMS baseline architecture includes a total of four
250-MB disk drives. Two of these are connected to MSUs
that transfer data and programs across the FDDI network
to the various subsystems. The other two disk drives are
attached to the two MPAC-F systems. It is not certain
how redundancy of data and programs is achieved with
this configuration, but it is assumed that the two disks on
the FDDI ring will maintain redundant copies of the soft-
ware to keep these systems alive. In a like manner, it is
assumed that the MPAC systems will have redundant
copies of the software kept on the disks attached to the
two MPAC-Fs.
The RODB is kept in RAM according to the DMS design,
and the telemetry data is transferred directly to the ground
via the CTS, so that leaves much of the disk space allo-
cated to the SDPs and MPACs available for software
binaries, swap and page files, and temporary data storage.
However, it is uncertain how redundant RODB data is
kept for recovery purposes if one SDP fails. Also, if the
SDP or MPAC reboot mechanism relies on the disk, a
boot program should reside on the booted system on a
battery-backed-up RAM or a ROM device to carry on
network file transfer protocol until the NOS boots up.
It would be much better for reliability and performance
under today's technology to have a single centralized disk
farm with a high-speed controller device that supports
disk mirroring (shadowing). This is a common method
used by several vendors to maintain reliable access to data
and programs. The proposed baseline configuration runs
the risk of having unacceptable initialization and recon-
figuration delays because the MSUs are shared across the
network and SDP operating systems will need to load
from them.
4.1.2.8. Runtime object data base performance on
the DMS kit: The MODB, on the ground, is the reposi-
tory for all controlled SSF data objects. The RODB,
onboard the $SF, contains a subset of the MODB objects
for use by all DMS applications. This seems like a good
method to control onboard intersystem data flow, but it
does not address the implied data-flow performance
requirements vis-a-vis the capability of the DMS. The
following analysis attempts a preliminary evaluation of
the RODB capability in relation to typical requirements.
The DMS Critical Design Review (CDR) lists 11 restric-
tions that "must be followed if an application is to cor-
rectly operate in a DMS environment" (ref. 16). Three of
those restrictions apply directly to how applications
should use the RODB:
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Figure 4- I. Centrifuge faci/ity/SSF interface scheme (CRs in the figure are changes requested for pay/oad
accommodation).
"3) Displays are independent of applications. All data to
be displayed is written to the RODB. Display generators
can read the data from the RODB at their discretion.
"4) All data shared by programs is shared through the
RODB.
"7) All program-to-program communication is provided
through RODB actions and attributes. This is true for both
intra- and inter-node communications."
The DMS uses the RODB to decouple one application
from another. Because applications only know about the
data they read or write into RODB, they do not need to
know what or how other applications place data into the
RODB. This interapplication independence allows system
designers and users to view an application as an ORU,
with the RODB playing the role of the data bus.
This ability to view applications as ORUs is conceptually
useful although it makes the RODB central to almost all
computation and sensor data, since all applications should
communicate via the RODB. If the ability of the RODB to
handle this traffic is too constrained, it may become a
bottleneck.
The performance of RODB has been evaluated recently at
the DMS Test Bed at Johnson Space Center (JSC). The
construction of this test bed is based on IBM's prototype
DMS kit, which consists of an MPAC, an SDP, and an
MDM simulator that runs on an IBM processor. The
MPAC is connected to the SDP via an FDDI network.
The SDP is connected to the MDM simulator via a 1553B
data bus. RODB runs on the DMS kit under IBM's AIX
operating system version 1.1 (as opposed to LynxOS).
Also available are a simulated DMS application (ECLSS)
and a simulator that acts like sensors and actuators to
provide a simulated MDM. The ECLSS simulation resides
and executes on the MPAC, the RODB on the SDP, and
the simulated MDM on a third processor.
A simple test program was written at JSC to measure
RODB access time. The program repetitively reads an 80-
byte object 10 times and averages those 10 reads over 100
executions. The test program resided and executed on the
same SDP processor that contained the RODB. In half the
cases, the data object was available in memory, and the
RODB retrieved the data object from the MDM for rest of
the cases. These tests were also done with and without the
ECLSS application running on the MPAC. Table 4-2
summarizes the results.
In the best case, with the information available locally and
no application load, it took 0.43 sec to access a single data
object. This is significantly slower than what would be
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Table 4-2. Average time for 10 reads of an 80-byte
object on DMS kit
Times for 10 reads No ECLSS ECLSS running
(see) (see)
Data available locally 4.29 8.39
Data accessed remotely 13.59 29.49
(via 1553)
required if the application actually used the DMS accord-
ing to the DMS CDR. Admittedly, the numbers are taken
from a prototype DMS kit; however, they do point to a
potential problem area. Assuming RODB could be opti-
mized by 2 orders of magnitude (or 100-fold), the best-
ease access time would drop to 4 msec. The remote
RODB access time would still be 14 msec. Translated into
a rate, the RODB could handle between 73 and 233 read
requests per second. If the RODB is to serve as central a
function as described in the DMS software CDR, the
suggested performance from a 100-fold speed increase
would still be insufficient.
A simple scenario illustrates the need for higher per-
formance in the RODB: Assume that a crew member
requests that certain information be displayed at an
MPAC. The associated display program would retrieve
the necessary information from the RODB, format it
appropriately, and issue X-window commands to display
the data. If we assume that the display retrieves 40 values
from the RODB, we can compute two different elapsed
retrieval times.
1. In the first scenario, the application program accesses
each object individually by sending a request to the
RODB via the FDDI network. RODB request messages
would have a network latency of 50 msec, an access
would require 4 msec, and the return message would
require an additional 50 msec for a total of 104 msec.
Forty such request cycles would add up to over 4 sec
elapsed time. This does not include the time to format,
create, and display the information.
2. The second scenario optimizes the RODB access by
predefining an RODB display object that has indirect
pointers to the 40 required parameters. In this situation,
100 msec is required for the round-trip message latency
plus an additional 164 msec for accessing the display
object; the associated 40 objects would need a total of
260 msec for this display operation.
loading caused by other applications can significantly
affect these numbers. In fact, the above data indicates that
merely running one other application (ECLSS) would
double the time needed to retrieve the display parameters.
4.2. System Dependability
The failure tolerance and redundancy management
(FT/RM) analysis for SSF is focused on the functional
requirements of the DMS integrated systems. This analy-
sis is based on a system modeling technique called
Digraph Matrix Analysis, which is currently being per-
formed as part of the design review process. Appendix E
describes the FT/RM process and two system modeling
techniques, and gives an example of the use of each
technique. The results of these investigations are useful in
determining single- and double-points of failure in the
DMS, as well as in predicting the performance of various
system configurations under failure conditions. ARC
participates in an FT/RM working group that meets
approximately every two months to review the status of
SSF FT/RM analysis.
4.3. Limitations on Growth and Evolution
Based on the design information available and the
preliminary evaluation results described in appendix D, it
appears that two general limitations on growth exist:
(1) poorly integrated real-time performance requirements
in the current design, and (2) the performance limitations
of bus and network protocol and interface standards
selected for the DMS.
4.3.1. Design uncertainty- The DMS design is a
distributed set of loosely coupled, real-time, embedded
processors. No system specification defines the worst-
case latency for the real-time interactions (whether
intended, unavoidable, or failure-related) between systems
or from systems to payloads. Limited system engineering
analysis to date has rationalized this design by assuming
that all subsystem interactions will be quasi-static and will
result in low intersystem activity at all processor nodes.
The RODB exemplifies this uncertainty: no explicit
response time requirements are included in the DMS CEI.
Since no real-word experiments have been done on such
a system (with RODB-based coordination) to date (exCept
for the recent prototype_ DMS kit me _asurements_escribed
in section 4.1.2.8), the performance has not been ques-
tioned. Potential integr//tidn prob|emscaused-by-s_ --.
systemmanagement _sPonse, unpredictable real-tim e....
A DMS loaded down wi_moreap_ications could easily ha_es, and uncontrolled subsystem interact, ons larva-
extend these times into the muitisecond range, w hichis :: not yet _been+addr_essed;a_ _11 not be visible _ ....
unacceptable from a human factors perspective. Other current development schedule until after CDR. Any ....
factors such as process scheduling delays and RODB problems discovered with system integration will make
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reconfigurationfor_owthadifficultandcostlyprocess.
Onboard,real-time,integrationtestandverification
(IT&V)issupportedbyDMS(ref.5,p.4-5),butIT&Vis
anopen-endedrequirement;it iseasytodoforminor
softwareupgrades,butnearlyimpossibletodoforanew,
high-performance,embeddedprocessorwithoutexplicit
intersystemresponse-timespecifications.
ExperimentalperformancetestswithDMSbaseline
designcomponentsarenotpossibleviakitsforanother
8-12months(therearenohigh-fidelityfunctionalequiva-
lentunits(FEU)forFDDINIA,orNOS,no1553Bus
InterfaceAdapter(BIA)andMDMs,andnoLynxOSin
theprototypekits).
TheDMSopticalnetworkcannotsupportthecritical
communicationsthatwillberequiredforfaultmanage-
mentbecausethelatencies(usingFDDI)arespecified
onlyatthe95%probability,undernormalconditions
(withoutfailures).Furthermore,configurationlatencies
areimplementationdependentandareonlyloosely
specifiedforDMS.
4.3.2.Designlimits-End-to-endcommunicationsrelies
ongroundwide-areanetworkandmetropolitancommuni-
cationsprotocolsthatareinastateofrapidchange
(ref.19).However,theDMSdesigndoesnotprovidefor
thismajortechnologyshift.(1)Noprovisionismadeto
addopticalfibertoallORUsthatcurrentlyusecopper
datalinks.(2)Theopticalfiberusedseemstobecapable
ofatleasta1-Gbpsdataratebasedonthemodalband-
width,butit is only specified to support the 100 Mbps of
FDDI. (3) No system integration methods are specified
for inserting new systemwide technologies (e.g., reliable,
fully distributed real-time systems, order-of-magnitude
speedup in new processors, or order-of-magnitude
increases in mass storage).
The local bus capacity of 700 kbps to core MDMs leaves
little margin for growth. The approximately 60 MDMs
in the baseline design represent most of the user-
programmable processing power, but they have the least
powerful connectivity to each other and to the crew or
ground. This limits their capability and increases the life-
cycle cost of developing and maintaining application
programs on them.
Referring to the descriptions of the NIU (section 3.3.2),
the RC (section 3.3.3), and the SDP (section 3.3.4) with
their attendant figures, one can see that the NIU domi-
nates the SDP in complexity and requires 55 w out of a
total of 130 w. Unfortunately the implementation provides
only 5 Mbps maximum for full OSI services and has no
guaranteed real-time access latency. The application EDP
provides less than 3 MIPS and 4 MB for user code and
requires 28 w. Thus the SDP design represents a method
that has a limited ability to support future added payload
or processing requirements, even compared to current
workstation technology. Payload users are already con-
sidering the creation of their own processors and using the
HRL for telemetry, even though they face a considerable
development cost to do so. (See figure 4-1 for an example
and section 5.2 for recommendations.)
Mass Storage can only be added to the optical network, so
NIU performance limits mass storage performance. (The
mass storage disk fits into a standard chassis and uses a
controller on a Multibus 11 backplane, but the interfaces
and protocol for such additions are not defined.)
The need for on-orbit assembly resulted in multiple feed-
through connections of fiber optics in the present design,
as shown in figure 4-2. This creates a significant loss of
the optical signal, which eventually could lead to the use
D Connector Bulkhead connector
) (
Figure 4-2. Typical path of optical signal showing multiple feed-through points.
19
of optical regenerators. These in turn limit data band-
width, add to DMS power consumption, and reduce the
overall optical link reliability. Therefore, the final limit
for future growth is the connectivity provided by initial
cables, connectors, and regenerators installed and tested at
PMC. (See section 5.2.1.3 for recommendations.)
5. Recommendations for DMS Growth and
Evolution
During the 30-year mission life of SSF, significant growth
in user needs as well as computational technologies will
take place. Therefore, the DMS should be designed from
the outset to accommodate changes in functionality,
performance, and technology. It should allow both near-
term growth and long-term evolution. The term "growth,"
in this section, represents hardware and software changes
that can be applied to the DMS quickly to meet a specific
mission need. The term "evolution" refers to a more
global and long-term process that enables developing
technologies to be incorporated into the DMS. The ability
to transfer technological innovations as they become
available will affect not only SSF, but other future NASA
programs and initiatives as well.
As discussed in section 4, the current capabilities of the
DMS might not be able to meet performance and reliabil-
ity requirements from the outset. NASA should be pre-
pared to have (1) more tests to determine whether the
current DMS software and hardware can meet current
requirements, (2) near-term plans for augmenting DMS's
capability with minimal impact on the rest of the system,
and (3) a long-term policy and mechanism for technology
insertion.
5.1. Recommendations for Further Tests
5.1.1. System level tests- Test bed experiments aT .ARC
involving a collection of workstations based on Reduced
Instruction Set Computer (RISC) and Complex Instruction
Set Computer (CISC) processors are in progress. No
commitment has been made to purchase a prototype DMS
kit because of ARC's ongoing liaison with the DMS
developers at JSC and MDSSC, the advanced nature of
the evolution studies, and the immaturity of available
prototypes. ARC test bed plans do include experiments on
the DMS kits in the next fiscal year, when the first devel-
opment-quality operating system, NOS, and network
protocol implementations are scheduled to be inserted in
the kits.
A variety of tests will beconducted to assessthe v_ability
of present and evolutionary hardware and software
configuration options. These include real-time operating
system mixtures on present 386 processors, with possible
successor CISC (e.g., 486) and RISC processors. The real-
time environment should also be assessed before the
actual SSF avionic codes are designed, developed, and
integrated. One option is to initially use Ames/Dryden
Flight Research Facility (DFRF) aeronautic applications
now running on advanced aircraft. Those functions may
closely approximate many of the key upcoming SSF
avionic applications, as shown in table 5-1.
Table 5-1. SSF/DFRF avionics subsystem analogues
SSF Avionic Applications Available DFRF Avionic
Analogues
Thermal Control System Thermal Management
(TCS)
Fluid Management System Hydraulics Management
(FMS)
Electrical Power System Power Management
(EPS)
Guidance, Navigation, and
Control (GN&C)
Propulsion
Operations Management
Application (OMA)
Communications and
Tracking
Environmental Control
and Life Support
System (ECLSS)
Crew Health Care Systems Life Support
(CHeCS)
Vehicle Controls
Vehicle Propulsion
Mission Planning
Navigation Control, Comm.
Life Support
Although these applications are not exact analogues and
most are written in Fortran or C, they are available now in
validated code and specifications. Evaluating them on
LynxOS, 386/486 PS2 platforms will provide insights into
issues involving expected versus actual real-time perfor-
mance issues. If there are sufficient resources, conversion
of selected DFRF applications to Ada might generate
indications of language and compiler real-time
development issues.
Local area network protocol comparisons will also be
made, for example comparing relative overheads between
theOSI standard, s_andard Transmission Control
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), "optimized _*
(Jacobsen) TCP/IP, and the IEEE "eXpress Transfer
Protocol" (XTP) from Protocol Engines, Santa Barbara.
XTP has been selected as the Navy Safenet II standard
protocol and offers significant real-time speed (<1 msec
end-to-end) and reliable delivery of control messages.
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5.1.2.Lynx operating system- As we have learned from
the Space Shuttle program and many other space projects,
a software upgrade and enhancement costs much more
than a hardware upgrade. The ability of the DMS to
handle software growth will play a crucial role in the
success of DMS evolution.
Operating system (OS) software is the foundation of the
DMS software because most of the other software
components are built on top of the OS. The selection of
LynxOS for the DMS OS seems to be a good choice; it
provides a real-time capability (see section 3.4.1.) and the
advantages of a standard UNIX-based operating system.
One of the most important advantages for DMS is the
portability of a UNIX OS. The relative ease of porting an
application from one processor platform to another is
important for DMS because of the long lifespan of the
SSF and the need to prevent obsolescence in the DMS.
The following paragraphs discuss some features of
LynxOS that need to be evaluated and/or fine-tuned for
DMS.
1. Interaction between typical UNIX processes is not
optimized because they mostly represent individual users.
In contrast, all the tasks in a real-time system typically
cooperate in a time-sensitive domain to perform a single
integrated function. There is more communication
between tasks, even at interrupt levels. This capability
will become crucial for SSF fault recovery, vehicle health
monitoring, and vehicle health management functions.
Strict control of response timing, interrupt handling, and
task switching will also be required to maintain high
confidence levels during system Validation and
Verification (V&V). The combination of LynxOS, the
386-based EDP/NIU (SDPs), MDM processors, and the
FDDI/1553B network interfaces should be simulated and
evaluated in a test bed to assess its ability to deal with the
full synchrony of real-time functions projected for SSF.
2. Many real-time processes need to be locked into ........
memory so that memory paging does not occur during
time-critical events. In "standard" UNIX, there is no
ability to lock pages of memory. Calls or other mecha-
nisms that support the ability to lock specific areas of
memory on an address or length basis are strongly desired
and are the subject of much present discussion in the
IEEE POSIX real-time subgroup meetings. For compati-
bility reasons, additional features that allow for locking of
text and data segments of a process should also be
provided. The memory locking features of LynxOS
should be tested.
3. Another very common real-time requirement is the
need to poll. For example, a process may have to be
awakened periodically to take a temperature measure-
ment. Quick action may be required if the temperature
strays beyond established bounds. The default quantum
size for each process in LynxOS version 1.2 is 64 clock
ticks, which translates to 0.64 sec. This value is much
higher than a standard UNIX, which is typically around
0.1 sec. The default quantum size in LynxOS can be
changed without modification to the LynxOS source
program, and a new kernel can be created by the "make
install" command after the quantum size is changed. The
quantum size needs to be evaluated and fine-tuned for
DMS.
4. The LynxOS ability to wait on multiple events should
also be tested. The standard UNIX "select(2)" routine
does not work well with standard UNIX semaphores and
message queues because the latter two do not use the file
name space. The particular mechanisms that Lynx, Inc.
has devised for waiting on multiple events should be
evaluated.
5. Real-time control systems are often run via semaphores
that should be accessible by drivers and processes alike.
The System V UNIX semaphore is complicated, slow, and
does not allow driver access. POSIX has defined a simple
binary semaphore mechanism. LynxOS performance
should be fully evaluated in this region.
6. In addition to the scheduling algorithm, task "dispatch
latency" is also critical to real-time applications. Dispatch
latency is the time interval between the return of a driver
from an interrupt to the time the first instruction is
executed in the highest priority program in the system.
7. Regular files in a standard UNIX file system are
implemented as logically contiguous byte streams.
Internally, however, they are simply lists of blocks in no
particular order. The file system caching mechanism,
though useful for speeding ordinary accesses, limits
throughput because of relatively small transfer sizes. The
time needed to access individual blocks in a regular file
may not be constant, because other internal "pointer"
blocks may need to be fetched. For these reasons,
throughput through the file system may be limited to a
value somewhat lower than the ideal disk transfer rates.
LynxOS's implementation of the file system should be
tested to ensure the timely retrieval of critical data.
8. The raw disk interface transfers directly to and from
user memory, and so allows speeds approaching optimal
disk transfer speed. The important restriction when
writing to a raw disk device is that transfer should be in
increments of 512 bytes, and applications should use large
transfer sizes if possible. In addition to regular disk files,
LynxOS provides a utility and a system call to create a
contiguous file. However, creation of a contiguous file
takes time. The kernel should search the free block list for
a run of contiguous blocks. For DMS applications, it is
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recommended that a buffer be created in advance and
reused because of the long creation time for a contiguous
file. It should be noted that LynxOS does not prohibit
users from creating a very large contiguous file. This
capability may need to be constrained to a certain file size
for payload applications.
All of the the features listed here are scheduled for tests in
the ARC Advanced Architecture Test Bed this year in
coordination with the ISC Work Package-2 developers
and other government, university, and industry
participants.
The U.S. Navy Next Generation Computer Resource
Program (NGCR) and Space and Naval Warfare Program
(SPAWAR) offices, for example, have found that the
present POSIX definition of real-time facilities are still
inadequate for their more "hard-core" real-time applica-
tions and have gone far further in defining their own real-
time operating system guidelines. ARC has begun an
effort to work with the Navy in these and other
Ado/Language and communication/network/backplane
arenas.
Preliminary tests at ARC have established a baseline of
latencies for sending datagram-type messages using
commercial RISC- and CISC-based workstations. The
tests have illustrated the difficulties of porting measure-
ments between dissimilar machines even though they can
all claim POSIX compatibility; however, successful
repeatable results have been generated. The tests clearly
illustrated the differences in time measurement granularity
(time granularity ranges from 3.9 to 20 msec) and uncov-
ered a network driver bugin one workstation. On the
more powerful workstations tested, an overhead delay of
approximately 4 msec (average) was observed for the
send/receive loop between two stations. The tests of PSI2
with LynxOS are not complete as yet, but it appears to
have approximately the sonic average performance, with
standard UNIX the maximum latencies observable can be
quite large, but the LynxOS overhead is claimed to be
small; these values are also scheduled to be measured at
the ARC Test Bed.
Finally, IEEE POSIX standards include (1) P 1003.1 for
system interface, (2) P1003.2 for shell and utilities,
(3) P 1003.3'for verification }esting, (4) Pi003.4 forreal'
time extension, (5) P1003.5 for Ado language binding,
(6) P1003.6 for trusted system extension, and(7) P1003.0
E_r open system guidelines. P1003.1 is the only one that
,_as been completed and published by IEEE. All other
standards are still in draft versions.
P1003.1 covers the basic system interfaces, such as
process primitives, process environment, files and directo-
ries, input and output primitives, and device-specific
functions. But P1003.1 does not cover other features
essential for real-time applications, such as priority
scheduling, interprocess communication, and high-
resolution timers. In addition, the future successes of Ada
language bindings to POSIX will be important for
mission-critical applications. NASA needs to influence
the decision of the P1003.4 and P] 003.5 working groups
to achieve the Agency's best interest. JSC software
goups are involved in this process.
5.1.3. Other tests- Although the choice of the FDDI
protocol for the Optical network seems to be a good one
for projected performance and reliability reasons, the
implementation for the DMS does not include a specific
performance level. This raises concerns about the final
DMS FDDI characteristics. Such system-level develop-
ment risks will not IX tested until after CDR, according to
the current schedule. Some issues associated with FDDI
implementations will be testable on commercial hardware
in fiscal year 1991, and ARC has plans to begin such tests
and supporting simulations early in 1991 on an extended
FDDI test bed (subject to programmatic support).
Technical coordination will be maintained with the DMS
developers and with the Naval Ocean Systems Center,
San Diego, where a major FDDI test bed exists to perform
Navy Safenet I/tests.
5.2. Recommendations for Short-Term Growth
5.2.1. Connectivity-Beyond AC, additional functional
components will be added to the DMS. Successful inser-
tion of these components depends on the scars provided
by the initial design as well as on the capacity of the net-
work and bus connections. The modular baseline design
provides a good starting point (i.e., scars) for adding
hardware components. SDP successors, bridges, gate-
ways, or MPACs can be added via RCs, as needed. BIUs
may also be added to connect the 802.4 bus (currently
deferred until AC) for enhanced sensor/effector
connectivity.
Inside the major ORUs (MDMs excepted), a Multibus II
backplane bus provides high-performance connectivity
between embedded processors, memory, and interface
adapters. However, the choice of the 1553B standard for
the local bus and the design of the NIU interface to the
DMS optical network may limit the speed with which
critical messages can be exchanged between ORUs over
the network. There are two problems:
1. The Bus Interface Adapter (BIA) to the local bus
connecting to the MDMs uses 1553B protocol which has
a maximum throughput of 700 kbps. This connection is a
bottleneck and limits the growth of MDMs and the
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standardconnectivitycapabilitytopayloads and core
subsystems.
2. The NIU to the optical network is designed to have a
separate bus (MicroChannel) from a standard 386-based
controlling embedded processor to the network interface.
This design limits the data flow rate between applications
and the network because of the memory-copying require-
ment between isolated data buffers. (See section 3.3.2 for
quantitative values.)
5.2.1.1. Sensor/effector interface (MDMs/1553B):
Sensor/effector growth is difficult to quantify because it
depends on the connectivity in and around the MDMs,
whose designs have not yet been completely specified
(see section 4.1.2.5). Inside the MDM, an I/O bus pro-
vides a connection to a variety of standard I/O cards, and
an embedded 386SX-based processor uses a separate bus
for a custom, user-designed card. More than 60 MDMs
are considered baseline with the low-risk, but limited-
capacity and limited-adaptability 1553B local bus
connection (see section 3.3.5). An alternate local bus is
proposed that would have about six times the capacity via
optical media and the IEEE 802.4H standard protocol, but
its qualification is presently deferred. Thus no current I/O
requirements can be based on its use.
5.2.1.2. Optical network between systems: The
optical media selected for the network has a capacity for
growth to at least 10 times the FDDI protocol rate (to
approximately 1 Gbps), and the FDDI channel rate of
100 Mbps provides some near-term capacity for growth.
However, the NIUs resident in each ORU are specified to
support only 1/10 the capacity of the FDDI network. This
limitation has little impact on the projected data flow
requirements for PMC, but could be a bottleneck to the
high-performance and robust automated data-flow
requirements anticipated for improved system monitoring
and FDIR applications. The NIU design is based on the
same 386-based embedded processor as the SDP applica-
tion processor. This reduces initial qualification cost and
risk, but limits throughput growth for future requirements.
Power allocated to the NIA (table 3-2) seems high for
such limited performance and suggests the need for a
technology change at some point in SSF's mission.
This NIU implementation will have a high life-cycle cost,
even over the first 10 years of operation, because it will
either require an early changeout across most of the net-
work, or become the design driver (and limiting factor)
for other system upgrades. Since integrated operation ....
performance and reliability requirements are still under
development, and the experience with FDDI interface
adapters is very limited, the NIU could become a bottle-
neck for key interfaces in the baseline DMS (e.g., the
Communications and Tracking interface).
5,2,1.3. Recommendation for connectivity: In
summary, two recommendations are made to improve
connectivity:
1. Local bus connectivity should be improved, both in
total capacity and in ease of adaptation to general
interelement communication. Early development of the
802.4H protocol interface and distribution of the fiber
optic media to all hardware racks is recommended.
Making the 802.4H local bus available early provides a
low-risk method to support requirement changes during
development and alternative technologies at AC. In
addition, it satisfies the top-level requirement to provide
growth and evolution flexibility for both payload and core
systems.
2. An alternate NIU and/or network design study is
recommended to reduce both development and life-cycle
risk. The NIU appears to be a major risk to growth as well
as to initial system integration because of complexity and
power. The fact that it is functionally inline with all real-
time intersubsystem performance and reliability issues but
is scheduled late in the development is additional reason
for concern.
5.2.2. SDP performance-
5.2.2.1. 386 performance and instruction set archi-
tecture: The Intel 386DX microprocessor was selected to
be the main processor for the DMS SDP almost four years
ago. By AC, in 1999, the 386 chipset will be 13 years old,
and the 486 chipset, nearly 10. Even at present, the rela-
tive performance of the 386 and 486 are low compared to
other processors available today. Although many COTS
software products are in the X86 inventory, only a small
percentage of these relate directly to embedded, Ada-
based, fault-tolerant, real-time application areas. The
software product match for such disciplines is far more
prevalent among the high-performance (RISC) work-
station processors. Furthermore, some initial simulations
of SSF application workloads have shown a requirement
for at least 8 MIPS, and this still results in relatively large
queue (ref. 7, pp. 5-23).
Increasing the processor performance and capability has
become a necessity. However, performance is only one
criterion when selecting a processor as the baseline for the
DMS. Selecting a processor implies adopting its instruc-
tion set architecture (ISA), on which all of the system
software will be implemented. Replacing processors with
incompatible ISA implies an extremely costly, time-
consuming process of software V&V. Therefore, selecting
an ISA that has potential for growth and strong commer-
cial support will help ensure that SDP processors can be
upgraded easily in the Growth phase of the SSF.
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5.2.2,2. Upgrading SDP using Intel 486: For
meeting near-term performance needs, staying within
Intel 80X86 ISA may be a reasonable option because of
the cost and time required for revalidating DMS software.
Therefore, the 486 seems to be a natural candidate for
upgrading the SDP for several reasons:
1. It is 100% binary compatible with the 386, and the
486 ISA is a superset of the 386 ISA. (It contains six more
instructions than the 386.)
2. It has higher performance. In laboratory benchmark
tests carded out at ARC, the floating point performance of
the 486 (with an 8-Kbyte internal on-chip cache) was
about 3 times higher and the integer performance about
2 times higher than the 386 (with a 64-Kbyte external
cache). The 486 bus is also faster than the 386 bus.
3. It consumes less or equal power. The 486 consumes
less power than the combination of the 386DX and the
387DX. The system board of the 486 also consumes less
power than the 386 board.
4. It has higher integration. The on-chip integration of the
486 includes a floating point unit, an 8 Kbyte on-chip
cache, and a memory management unit.
5. It provides multiprocessor support. The 486 supports
multiprocessor instructions, cache consistency protocols,
second-level cache, and other multiprocessor support
hooks.
However, there two main concerns in regard to the use of
the 486 for the DMS:
1. The 486 has an on-chip, 8 Kbyte internal cache for
instructions and data. The cache does not have an error
detection and correction (EDAC) function and is therefore
not suitable for space applications. Even though the inter-
hal cache of the 486 can be disabled by software control,
the impact on performance is not yet determined. A
larger, second-level, parity-checked external cache may
also be necessary to improve the performance.
2. Work Package-2 is required to deliver a space-qualified
processor for DMS in 1992. Intel has no plans to produce
a space-qualified 486 by then. 5
5.2.2.3. Upgrading SDP using Intel i860: DMS is
expected to support applications that require fast floating-
point operations. Although the 486 provides an on-chip
floating-point processing unit, its performance can be
further enhanced by adding coprocessors. Among
5 Accord;.r,g to Intel's schedule, a MIL-STD-883C Class B,
military-qualified 486 will be available in the second quarter
of 1992, and a Class S, space-qualified 486 in the second quarter
of 1993.
commercially available coprocessors compatible to
386/486, the Wizard Adapter, 6 based on the Intel i860,
provides impressive performance potential for several
reasons:
1. The i860 is a 64-bit, RISC-based, high-performance
processor. It is currently available at 33 MHz (41 MIPS)
and 40 MHz (50 MIPS).
2. The i860 can be used as a stand-alone CPU. It has been
optimized for floating-point and graphics operations.
3. The i860 chip includes an integer core unit, a floating-
point unit, a 3-D graphics unit, an 8-Kbyte data cache, a
4-Kbyte instruction cache, and a memory management
unit.
4. Intel plans to havethe i860 meet the MIL-STD-883C
Class B military qualification in the second quarter of
1991. It takes about one additional year to process a
space-qualified chip after its military-qualified version is
available.
5.3. Recommendations for Long-Term Evolution
5.3.1. Toward a functionally distributed system archi-
tecture-- The use of distributed systems for ground-based
applications is widespread. Primary advantages of
distributed systems over centralized systems include
enhanced reliability, flexibility, and resource sharing.
Incorporating distributed technologies in the DMS was a
wise decision for the SSF Program.
However, the full benefits of incorporating distributed
systems will only be achieved in the evolutionary DMS.
The current baseline for the DMS is a mix of distributed
and centralized technologies. Although the FDDI back-
bone connects the various subsystems, its capacity and its
........... are underutilized. Dedicated links are
6 The IBM Wizard Adapter card contains an Intel i860,
2 Mbytes of memory, and three IBM chips to interface with the
host CPU (IBM PS/2 Model 70 or 80; 386 or 486) through the
MicroChannel. The card can run IBM OS/2 or AIX OS
operating systems. It can do numeric-intensive portions of
386/486 jobs, or it can run complete jobs independently from,
but under the control of, the host 386/486. An lntel i860 Soft-
ware Development Tool-kit, including a C compiler, assembler,
linker, and library is available. All code for the Wizard Adapter
must be recompiled using the Tool-kit. Tasks run best on the
adapter if their I/O requirements are limited. The Wizard
Adapter may have potential for the DMS. A Wizard Adapter
running with the 386 may be rated at about 30 MIPS, which is
superior to most RISC processors and the 486. Although a
coprocessor card will consume more power, its increased
performance may enable reduction of DMS SDPs. Researchers
at ARC plan to measure the performance of representative
workloads on a 386DX/486 with a Wizard Adapter.
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providedwherethereisconcernthathebackbone
networkwillnotbeabletosupportafunction.Thisdesign
isdueinpartothedivisionofresponsibilitiesamong
workpackages.Itdoespermitindividualworkpackages
todevelopandverifytheirapplicationprogramsoninde-
pendentodesandstillprovidesomeassurancesthathe
systemcanbeintegratedlaterinthedevelopmentcycle.
ThecurrentbaselinefortheDMSnetworkinginfrastruc-
turecombinesstate-of-the-arttechnology(i.e.,FDDI)
witholdtechnology(i.e.,MIL-STD-1553).Eventhough
theFDDIbackbonewillbegrosslyunderutilizedinthe
initialconfiguration,itspresencewill facilitatevolution
oftheDMStoatrulydistributedsystem.Evolvingfrom
FDDI-ItoFDDI-IIandthentoFDDI-FOisapaththatis
likelytobefollowedwithinthecommercialworldaswell.
TheevolutionarygoalfortheDMSshouldbeasystem
thatisdistributedfunctionally,aswellasphysically.
Provisionofseparaten tworksforcoreandpayload
applicationsa theDMSevolveswillallowtheuseof
state-of-thearttechnologiesforthepayloadnetwork
whilemoreconservativetechnologiesareusedforthe
life-criticalandsafety-criticalcoreapplications.Ideally
thepayloadnetworkshouldprovideaninfrastructurethat
isreminiscentofthescientist'sground-basedlaboratory.
High-speedtransmissionli ksshouldhandleallkindsof
traffic,audioandvideoaswellasdigital.Useofdedi-
catedlinksshouldbeminimized;largenumbersof
special-purposepoint-to-pointlinkscanbedifficulto
maintain,besidessoakingupvaluablepower,weight,and
volumeresources.Anotheressentialfeatureoftheevolu-
tionaryDMSistheabilitytoprocessscientificdatain
space,soastosubstantiallyreducetheamountof data that
needs to be transmitted to the ground. If the payload
portion of the DMS mimics ground-based systems, then
SSF will be able to incorporate new technologies as they
are developed.
The current DMS architecture is not a truly distributed
system, but the evolution of the DMS will necessarily
require more distribution of resources. As the resources
become more and more distributed, the DMS optical
network will become increasingly important.
5.3.2. Operating system/Ada runtime environment-
Based on initial simulation and experimental results at
MDSSC, ARC, and JSC test beds, it seems possible that
1. Keep the 386 hardware and move to a more efficient,
less (memory) resource-sapping, ROMable real-time OS
2. Keep LynxOS and try to transition it to a faster
microprocessor chipset (e.g., the 486)
3. Change to faster hardware and software components,
keeping only the basic fiber-optic network connectivity
media the same
The driving premise of the JSC/SSF/SATWG 7 Avionics
"Open Software Architecture" definition is its emphasis
on source-level portability. Many processors with perfor-
mance levels far beyond the 386 now exist and offer real-
time operating systems (including UNIX-based ones).
Multiple chipsets, especially RISC microprocessors, are
being cast in Class S component technologies on today's
fabrication lines. Modem microprocessors offer Ada
compilers, some using advanced Ada Tasking capabilities
in real-time domains that have more stringent require-
ments than the DMS. Some workstations available today
offer FDDI interconnectivity, and advanced lab models
are demonstrating fiber-optic bandwidths at the 1-Gbaud
(100-125 MB/sec) level.
During the projected 30-year life span of the SSF, it is
possible that parallel processing will become more
available. Intel has predicted that the next generation of
microprocessors in the 1990s may have multiple CPUs in
a single chip. In order to take advantage of this trend, the
DMS OS may have to evolve to support parallel com-
puters. Several UNIX-based multiprocessor OSs have
been developed in the past, such as Dynix, which runs on
the Sequent Balance computer; Symunix, which runs on
Ultracomputer of New York University; UNICOS, which
runs on Cray supercomputers; and Mach from Carnegie
Mellon University, which supports a diverse mix of
platforms.
Mach is the most portable multiprocessor OS. It has been
ported to the Sequent Balance, Encore Multimax, and
BBN Butterfly, but it also runs on single processors, such
as Sun 3 workstations and NeXT computers. It offers
"lightweight processes," called threads, that do not carry
the full state of a UNIX process. Creating a thread is less
expensive and faster than creating a new process.
Research Scientists at ARC have been studying Mach,
UNICOS, and other multiprocessor OSs. The study results
the combination of 386 hardware and LynxOS software may be beneficial to DMS OS decisions in the long run.
will be insufficient to meet both electrical power con- 5.3.3' A scenario for growth and evolution- Figure 5-1
straints and long term computational needs. The power
and weight problems continually generate "scrub" activity
in one direction, whereas growing computational perfor-
mance needs constantly motivate an ever-growing number
of CRs and RIDs. Should this scenario become the case,
three logical options would remain:
illustrates a possible path toward developing spaceborue,
mission-adaptive architectures and a method by which
these efforts could relate to the SSF DMS. From the pas-
sive (read only) tap to the DMS FDDI core ring, actual
7Strategic Avionics Technology Working Group
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missiondatacouldbefedtoadvancedarchitectural
modules,performingmirroredfunctionsusingsource-
compatible(Ada)applications.Thisnoninvasive,
mirroredcapabilitywouldassistintheV&Vprocessof
DMSupgradesbeforefunctioncutovertonewerand
fasterequipment.
Theleftsideoffigure5-1showsaprocessforevaluating
variousadvancedhardware,software,andconnectivity
scenarios.Thebasicelementofthisprocessi astudyof
advancedconnectivityechnologies,spanningtheentire
intersystem(fiber-opticnetworkmediandprotocols)and
intrasystem(board-level)domains.Theresultof these
studiescanthenbetestbeddedusingeitherbackplanes
suchasFutureBus+,oradvancedfiber-opticrossbars,or
both.Oncethisconnectivityplatformisinplace,many
differentCISC,MISC,andRISCprocessorandcoproces-
sorcombinationscanbeevaluatedalongsideother
advancedperipheral,intersystemnetworkandcommuni-
cation(I/O)boardfacilities.Onsuchtestbeds,these
advancedconceptscanbeevaluatedwithothernon-
NASAgovernmentandindustrysectors.A paralleleffort
shouldthenforceallevaluatedcomponentsthroughthe
"Long-RangeArchitecturalScalabilityFilter"described
inappendixD.
PerhapsthemostcriticalissueinDMSevolutionisits
abilitytoupgradetransparentlyandnoninvasively.To
ensurethis,havingconcludedthatthemultimodefiber-
opticmediumiscapableoffargreaterbandwidthcapacity
thantheoriginalFDDI/OSIdesign,thereshouldbea
secondring(orcrossbar)networkconfiguredintherace-
waysatlaunchwithpassive(readonly)tapstothecore
FDDIring.Overtime,thiswouldallowfornewer,faster,
lesspower-hungryprocessorandsoftwarenhancements,
plusadvancedfibertransceiversandprotocols.New
gigabitswitchingoptionshouldalsobeevaluatedforthe
post-ACtimeframe.Thesewouldallowtheintegrationof
processorp oductsregardlessoftheparticularbackplane
(orbackplaneless)architectureused.
Shouldthei386processorchipsetbefoundinadequatein
thefuture,thereshouldbeabackuplan.Theassumed
progressionhasbeeninthedirectionof thei486andits
compatiblesuccessors.AppendixD,however,showsthat
thispath,beinghigh-densityCISC,isalonganddifficult
one.RISCtechnologiesxhibitsignificantassetsforthe
longtermandshouldbestudiedfortheirabilitytobe
quicklyincludedinpost-ACconfigurationsandfortheir
long-termscalability.NaturalcandidatesincludeSun
SPARC(eightvendors),IvlIPSR4000/R6000(five ven-
dors + USAF JIAWG support for R2000/R3000 RISC
chips currently available), Intel i860, and the Motorola
88000 family. All of these have gained some level of
international acceptance in the embedded, Ada, realtime
OS, and radiation-hardened single-event-upset-tolerant
arenas. Complimentary studies should be conducted on
radiation and SEU hardness of the candidate technologies,
comparing the gate/transistor density characteristics of the
Advanced Mission-Adaptive Archetecture Development
Future, advanced architectures
SDP
Defense SDP
_gponerlt .n_lnntra_ttOr_ore _mm:Uter houSOfl_l_e SDP _
___.k_....
Long-renge, archltectural $calablllty "filter" INIAI _ ....
_'_j_c_--_j)_'_ _ _ _ (mild only) ff
Hardware Id:_ n_com pa_]_ scarify i_i_._ _ DMS FDDI ring
I F,_u,.,_,,_ i1[]_+ "" and I or _ crossbar I flbarehannel I _
Advanced hi-bandwidthconnectivity evaluation
Figure 5-1. Scenario for inserting advanced SDPs into the DMS.
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technologies and candidate processor density require-
ments. This would identify the most "naturally evolvable"
processor candidates. Further, each candidate processor
should be evaluated from an "openness" standpoint in
regard to life-cycle costs.
Finally, during the evaluation process for all components
and modules, NASA should strive for an integration of
people and perspectives at the leading edges of
technology. The challenge is to shift from reactively
understanding new technology to pro-actively shaping it.
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A.2. Government Contacts
Many discussions and meetings with other Government
Departments and Agencies have shown common needs
and a desire to cooperate. Multiple government organiza-
tions have similar vound, aeronautic, space, real-time,
rad-hard and space-qualified requirements. Some are
leaders in advanced computer designs and standards for
these application areas. Below is a list of Governmental
bodies and initial hardware and software technologies
being considered:
* U. S. Navy: NGCR, SPAWAR and SAFENET
projects----distributed systems for shipboard
o Fiber Optic: "Scalable Coherent Interface" and "IEEE
FiberChannel"
o Fiber Optic Crossbar: Carnegie Mellon/Network
Systems and Ancor (with DoE)
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• Fiber Protocols (Safenet H standard): eXpress
Transfer Protocol (XTP)
• Advanced Backplanes: IEEE FutureBus+
(Muhibus 11, and VME successor)
• FutureBus+ Processor Boards (in construction):
• MIPS R3000, MILVAX, Motorola 88100, i80486,
AMD 29000, Motorola 68030
• Advanced RTOS' + POSIX realtime extensions
• Realtime Ada Tasking Analyses
• Submarine Inventory Tracking Applications
(These relate closely to SSF issues.)
• U. S. Air Force (RH-32 and JIAWG pro_ams):
• RH-32 Processors: MIPS and i860/960
• Laser Space/Ground Communications
• DARPA (ISTO projects, ARC Advanced Test Bed):
• Chipsets: i860, i960, iWARP
• Systems: Touchstone, Nectar, Encore Multimax
(i860 parallel), MCC 88100
• Hi-resolution Workstations & Fiber-Optic
Communication
• IEEE High Performance Peripheral Interface (HPPI):
• DC-to-1 Gigabaud/100 MByte/sec Single &
Multi-Mode Fiber
• Ancor Space Switch (Omega-Net-like Crossbar)
• Multiple Gigabaud Fiber-Optics to Standard
Backplane interface boards
° Visualization in Scientific Computing (ViSC)
B. ARC Simulation Report
B.L Abstract
A simulation of SDP 5 of the SSF DMS was imple-
mented using the CSIM package (ref. 20). The workload
model was taken from an MDSSC report (ref. 7) describ-
ing another simulation performed using Network 11.5.
The results of the two simulations were compared. Qual-
itative results were in general agreement, with both
studies predicting a very high usage for the Application
EDP and MDM processors, but low usage for the other
elements. The MDSSC report did not contain enough
information about the workings of the DMS to allow an
accurate simulation to be implemented based on the
report alone. Some of the missing information is
described, and ambiguities in the description are noted.
The results of a static analysis of the MDSSC workload
is presented and shows good agreement with the current
study, so any discrepancies may be attributed to
differences in the processing model.
B.2. Introduction
A simulation of the SSF DMS SDP 5 was carried out at
ARC to help validate and understand another simulation
performed by E. Y. Omori at MDSSC (ref. 7)--hereafter
referred to as the MDSSC report. The results of two
simulations: SDP 6 (Lab) and SDP 5 were described.
The two SDPs differ in the number of MDMs to which
they interface and the number of local busses used to
connect to the MDMs. This study only looked at SDP 5,
as it was the less complex system of the two.
The simulation was implemented in CSIM, a discrete
event simulation package obtained from the Microelec-
tronics and Computer Technology Corporation (ref. 20).
The package consisted of a library of subroutines that
allowed a discrete-event simulation to be implemented in
the C language. In a simulation, C functions may be
defined as independent processes, which use facilities,
simulate processing time with hold statements, wait for
declared events, or communicate with each other by
sending messages via mailboxes. Statistics on facility
utilization are kept automatically.
Because of the limitations of this simulation, as
discussed below, only utilization levels for the various
components of the SDP were obtained. The detail of the
simulation model was insufficient to obtain meaningful
queue lengths, latencies, or response times.
B.3. Model
In the CSIM simulation, physical elements of the SDP
were defined as facilities. The workload was defined as a
set of processes that utilize these facilities to carry out
the functions of the DMS. These elements are described
in more detail in the sections below.
B.3.1. DMS dements- The basic elements included in
the CSIM simulation are shown in figure B-1. All of
these units were simulated as facilities, allowing usage
levels to be automatically recorded. Processes were also
defined for the BIU, the NIU, and the NIA; these units
provide paths for data flow in two directions and need to
respond to requests from other units for the transmission
of data.
The main source of information concerning the opera-
tional characteristcs of each of the entities in the simula-
tion was in System Engineering and Integration Trade
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Figure B-1. SDP 5 simulation elements.
Studies (ref. 7, table 4.4-1, page 4-27). Each of the
elements in the simulation are described in the
paragraphs below.
B.3.1.1. Application EDP: The application
processor described in MDSSC Report (ref. 7,
table 4.4-1) has the following characteristics:
Table B- 1. Application processor characteristics
EDP instruction rate
System node management overhead
Default time slice for executing
processes of equal priority
OS processing time to
generate/accept NOS request
Process switch time
Internal time update process
Time data size for distribution
3.1 MIPS a
5%
100 msec
500 microsec
250 microsec
1000 instructions
14 bytes
aThis includes 7% EDP refresh. The significance of the
phrase "includes 7% EDP refresh" is unclear in refer-
ence 1; this could mean that 3.1 MIPS are available for
the execution of application programs or that only 93%
of this value, or 2.88 MIPS are available.
The ARC model consists of a 3.1 MIPS application
EDP, (see fig. B 1). Two overhead load factors of the
EDP mentioned in the MDSSC Report (ref. 7) were:
1. SM overhead of 5%, (table 4.4-1)
2. OS/Ada run-time environment (OS/Ada RTE)
overhead of 15% (page 6-2).
These factors, when included, effectively lower the
available processing rate of the EDP to 2.48 MIPS.
These load factors were simulated by defining two
processes that execute 10 times per sec and occupy the
Application-EDP for an appropriate amount of time,
totaling 5% and 15% of a 3.1 MIPS processor.
The time slicing value of 100 msec was included in the
simulation, as CSIM provides for a round-robin, priority-
based scheduling with time-slicing. However, since the
CSIM model does not provide for an overhead for
switching between processes, the switching time of
250 _tsec was not included. Thus, the value of the time-
slice parameter does not affect the utilization figures for
the EDP, as no overhead in switching between processes
is incurred in the simulation. If included, this factor
could increase usage of the EDP by a maximum of
0.25%, since the overhead would be incurred 10 times
per second at most.
An important question concerning the process switch
time is whether this overhead is incurred when a process
is started. Since the workload consists of many short
functions, this decision has a significant effect upon the
utilization of the EDP. Inclusion of a process switch time
for each execution of a job occurrence increased the load
on the Application-EDP by about 10%. The overhead of
500 I.tsec for generating or accepting an NOS request is
included in the simulation. It is assumed that this over-
head applies to the application EDP and not the NIU
EDP.
The internal time update process (ref. 7) was not
included in the simulation because, although the number
of instructions and size of the data message required
were given, the frequency of occurrence of the update
was not. Therefore, this function could not be modeled.
An update occurring once per second would increase
utilization of the EDP by 0.03% and the local bus by
0.016%.
B.3.1.2. Multibus II backplane: Table 4.4-2 in the
MDSSC Report (ref. 7) contains the following entry for
the Multibus II backplane that connects the Application-
EDP, the NIU, and the BIU!
Table B-2. Multibus I/characteristics
Multibus II back-
plane transfer rate,
transfer frame size,
overhead
32 MB/sec = 256 Mbits/sec
36 signal lines (32 data, 4 parity)
32 bit address followed by multi-
ple (up to 7 total) 32-bit data
signals
The backplane was modeled as a facility with a transfer
rate of 256 Mbits/sec, a frame size of 224 bits (seven
words), and an overhead of 32 bits per frame. The access
model used was a round-robin with a time-slice of
1 microsee.
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B.3.1.3, Network interface unit (NIU): Table 4.4-1
(ref. 7) contains entries that may pertain to the NIU:
Table B-3. NIU characteristics
NOS direct
access service
data overhead
NIU 2 byte
packet throughput
40 bytes = 320 bits
Direct Access Latency = 3.24 msec
+ 1.7 msec *(#msg in queue)
Non-Direct Access Latency =
9.5 msec + 2.8 msec *(# msg in
queue)
The meanings of these entries are unclear, and no further
information about the processing model of the NIU is
contained in the text. Page 6-12 describes the functions
of the NIU, but gives no information on its processing
load. Some of the information in table 4.4-1 (ref. 7) was
apparently obtained from an internal unpublished report
on network modeling that was not available for this
study. For these reasons, utilization levels of the NIU
could not be obtained. The NIU was modeled as a
passive routing device that acted as an interface between
the Application-EDP and the core network without
taking any processing time.
B.3.1.4. MicroChannel: The MicroChannel
connecting the NIU and the NIA is described this way in
the MDSSC Repport(ref. 7):
Table B-4. Microchannel characteristics
Microchannel
data transfer
rate, transfer
frame size,
overhead
13.3 MB/sec instantaneous transfer
rate -- 106.67 Mbps
8 bits per word (1 byte)
4 bytes/cycle transfer size (block size)
11% idle/89 % work = 12.36% over-
head = ~4 bits overhead per block =
-0.037079 [.tsec
B.3.1.6. Core network: Table 4.4-1 (ref. 7)
describes the characteristics of the FDDI protocol as
follows:
Table B-5. FDDI network characteristics
Packet size
Overhead
2048 bytes
MAC -- 28 bytes(-13.76%)(spec) + LLC =
I0 bytes
Total = 38 bytes = 304 bits
The transfer rate of the network is not given in the
MDSSC Report, but it is known from other sources to be
100 Mbits/sec. The network was thus modeled as having
a rate of 100,000,000 bits/sec, a frame size of 16384 bits
(2048 bytes), and an overhead of 304 bits/frame. A target
token rotation time of 0.006 sec was used to simulate the
delay in capturing the token. This number was derived
by allocating the maximum of 500 microsec for node
latency for each of 12 active nodes on the network. This
value does not affect the utilization of the network.
B.3.1.7. Bus interface unit: The BIU includes a
Bus Control Unit (BCU) and a BIA for controlling the
1553 local bus and connecting the Application-EDP to
the MDMs. Since no details of the BIU processing were
described in the MDSSC Report, utilization figures for
the BIU could not be obtained. The BIU was modeled as
a passive routing device that transfers data between the
backplane and the local bus.
B.3.1.8. Local bus: Table 4.4-1 (ref. 7) describes
the 1553 local bus this way:
Table B-6. Local bus characteristics
Packet size
Overhead
16 data bits/word with 4 bits
Max of 28 words per frame overhead
Message overhead of 4 words (commands,
status, etc.) plus message 4 I.tsec gap time,
plus 12 [tsec RT response time.
The microchannel was modeled with a transfer rate of
106,670 Kbits/sec and an overhead of 12.36% per
transfer.
B.3.1.5. Network interface adaptor (NIA): No
information about the NIA is given in table 4.4-1 (ref. 7),
nor is any given in the text. The NIA was therefore
modeled as a passive device that accepts data from the
microchannel and transmits it onto the network while
taking no processing time. No utilization figures for the
NIA were obtained.
The MDSSC Report (ref. 7) does not state the transfer
rate of the 1553 bus, but it is known from other sources
that the bus uses a I MHz clock rate for a transfer rate of
1 Mbit/sec. Table 4.4-1 (ref. 7) does give a value for the
BIA transformer to hybrid interface transfer rate as
0.7 Mbps, but it is not clear if this is the rate for bits
transmitted over the bus or if it is the effective data
transfer rate after subtracting overhead bits. The maxi-
mum effective data transfer rate can be calculated as
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0.74Mbps,sothesetwonumberscouldbethe same. The
stated transfer rate of the BIA was ignored.
The bus was modeled as a facility with a transfer rate of
1 Mbit/sec, a frame size of 448 bits, an overhead of
4 bits/word and 40 bits/frame, and a time-slice for access
of 616 microsec. In addition, a latency of 16 microsec
for bus access was used for the gap times.
B.3.1.9. Muitiplexer/demultiplexer: Table 4.4-1
(ref. 7) does not describe the characteristics of the
MDMs (there are two connected to SDP 5. However,
text on page 6-3 (ref. 7) describes the MDMs as contain-
ing a processor to run application programs, and
table 5.3.1-1, on page 5-23 (ref. 7) describing the com-
ponent variations run for SDP 6 implies that the proces-
sor speed of the baseline MDMs is 1 MIPS. Therefore,
the two MDMs for SDP 5 were modeled as processors
that can run application programs at a 1 MIPS rate.
B.3.2. Workload model- The workload model used by
MDSSC Report is described in detail in their report.
Tables 6.2-1 and 6.2-2 (ref. 7) give the specifications for
more than a hundred different functional job streams that
are to be executed on the Application EDP. Tables 6.2-3,
6.2-4, and 6.2-5 give the same information for the MDM
processors.
In the CSIM simulation the workload presented in these
tables was implemented by assigning each line of the
tables to a separate process that was scheduled at the
specified periodic rate. Each process utilized its proces-
sor to execute the number of instructions given in the
table. Some of the processes then initiated a data transfer
over the appropriate device.
The workload models also include utilization of the Run-
Time Object Data Base (RODB). Table 4.4-1 (ref. 7)
gives the following access times for the RODB:
Table B-7. RODB characteristics
Data conditioning, con-
version, limit check
Data base read/write
latency for local
application
Data output: data
preparation for remote
application across
network (source data
collection process)
i hi| i|1
100 p.sec/input + one of the
following:
50 lasec/number or
30 _tsec/discrete
100 _tsec overhead +
25 laseclobject read or
write
100 lasec overhead +
50 I.tsec/object = 150 lasec
total
B.3.2.1. Job scheduling: All of the jobs in the
CSIM simulation used the same method of job schedul-
ing. Each line in the five tables specifying functions with
their associated loads and frequencies was a separate
process. The first occurrence of each job was calculated
by taking a random number of uniform distribution
between zero and the scheduling period. Each subse-
quent occurrence was scheduled at the previous time
plus the job period. At the end of each occurrence, the
process would wait until the next scheduled time. If that
time had already passed, the job would not wait, but
execute immediately. Some jobs having a period veater
than the maximum simulation time (two min) did not
execute because the time of the first occurrence of the
job was past the end of the simulation.
B.3.2.2. Job models: Each of the five functional
tables for SDP 5 in the MDSSC Report required a
slightly different processing model. The models are
discussed below.
B.3.2.2.1. Node SDP application software and
derived object generation. These jobs are listed in
table 6.2-1 (ref. 7). Most of the jobs involve execution of
a number of instructions at a certain frequency. When
these jobs run, they utilize the Application-EDP for the
length of time required to execute the instructions, then
wait for the next scheduled time. A small number of
these jobs also involve access to the RODB. For these
jobs, the Application-EDP is also used to condition the
RODB objects: 100 microsec per occurrence plus
50 microsec for each object, with the numbers of objects
for each job given in table 6.2-1. The message size given
in table 6.2-1 is ignored, since it is not known how this
affects the processing.
B.3.2.2.2. Node SDP 5 core network loading
summary. These jobs, described in table 6.2-2 (ref. 7),
involve transmitting data over the core network. The
number of instructions required to prepare the output
messages is given, as is the total size of the message.
The Application-EDP is used to execute the number of
instructions given. It is then used to prepare the RODB
objects, although whether this should be done is not
clear. The data is then sent via the backplane to the NIU
for transmittal on the network.
B.3.2.2.3. Node MDM application function alloca-
tion. These jobs, described in table 6.2-3 (ref. 7), involve
instruction execution only on one of the MDM proces-
sors. There are 22 jobs listed, with the first 11 assigned
to MDM- 1 and the remaining 11 assigned to MDM-4.
There was no I/O associated with the jobs.
B.3.2.2.4. Node MDM I/0 processing activity. These
jobs, described in table 6.2-4 (ref. 7), involve interfacing
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withphysicaldevicesconnectedtotheMDMs:reading
sensorsandcontrollingeffectors.Thenumberof instruc-
tions required to prepare for the I/O are given, and this is
all that is simulated for these jobs. Since the sensor and
effector devices are not part of this simulation, the actual
amounts of I/O data involved were ignored.
B.3.2.2.5. Node MDM local bus traffic loading.
These jobs, described in table 6.2-5 (ref. 7), involve
transmitting data from the MDM to the Application-EDP
via the local bus, the BIU, and the backplane. The
resulting activity by the Application-EDP to store the
data into the RODB was not modeled, but could be
easily added to the simulation.
B.4. Results
Average utilization values for the components of SDP 5
were obtained from a two-minute simulation run. The
results of this simulation and those reported by MDSSC
are shown in table B-8. As indicated by the 100% utiliza-
tion figure listed for both simulations for the Application
EDP, this component is overloaded. The figures for the
other components do not compare very well, but con-
sidering the many assumptions that were made in
implementing this simulation model, the discrepancies
may easily be explained.
A breakdown of overall usage value into contributions
from the various elements of the workload and the
different functions required by those elements was
obtained by selectively enabling and disabling parts of
the simulation. This analysis was done using 10-sec
simulations. In addition, to confirm the utilization results
from the simulation, a static analysis on the workload
was performed to calculate the expected average
utilization of the Application-EDP and MDMs.
Table B-8.Results of SDP-5 Simulation
% Utilization
Component CSIM MDSSC
Application EDP 100.0 100.0
Backplane 0.0 0.2
Local bus 6.0 3.5
MDM-1 processor 86.3 44.3
MDM-4 processor 92.0 47.1
MicroChannel 0.0 0.4
Core network 0.1 5.1
B.4.1. Application-EDP analysis- The results of the
breakdown analysis for the Application-EDP processor
are shown in table B-9, which presents the contributions
to the Application-EDP load from the functional
elements of the workload presented in the MDSSC
Report (ref. 7). The utilization contributions were
derived from the static analysis of the workload func-
tions and from simulation runs in which the parts of the
workload were selectively enabled. The results in all
cases are in good agreement between simulation and
static analysis.
Table B-9. Application-EDP Analysis
% Utilization
Workload element Source Simulation Static
Application function Tbl 6.2-1 58.1 58.0
Derived object Tbl 6.2-1 2.8 2.8
generation
Core network object Tbl 6.2-2 31.7 31.7
generation
Core network Tbl 6.2-2 20.2 20.3
message creation
System management Tbl 4.4-1 5.0 5.0
OSIAda RTE page 6-12 15.0 15.0
Total: 132.80 132.80
B.4.2. MDM analysis- The breakdown of utilization of
the MDMs by workload functional elements as described
in tables 6.2-3, 6.2-4, and 6.2-5 (ref. 7) are shown for
MDM-1 in table B-10 and for MDM-4 in table B-11.
Here as well, the results from the simulation and from
the static analysis are in agreement. The MDSSC Report
(ref. 7), however, shows a significantly lower utilization
for both MDMs---about 50% of the usage shown in
table B-11. This would indicate that the processing
model used here for the simulation and static analysis is
not the same as used by MDSSC, but there is no further
information concerning their model.
Table B-10. Breakdown of MDM-I utilization
Workload element
% Utilization
Source Simulation Static
Application function Tbl 6.2-3 39.0 39.0
I/O processing Tbl 6.2-4 9.8 9.8
activity
Local bus traffic Tbl 6.2-5 37.5 37.6
loadin_
Total: 86.3 86.4
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TableB-11.BreakdownofMDM--4utilization
%Utilization
Workloadelement Source SimulationStatic
Applicationfunction Tbl6.2-3 42.0 42.0
I/Oprocessing Tbl6.2-4 10.3 10.3
activity
Localbustraffic Tbl6.2-5 39.8 39.8
loadin_
Total: 92.1 92.1
B.4.3. Other components- The utilization levels of the
other components included in this simulation were all
low--less than 10% of capacity in all cases. The agree-
ment between the two simulations is not very close in
these cases, however. The disagreement for the Core
Network and MicroChannel can be explained because
the MDSSC simulation included loading of the network
by SDP nodes other than SDP 5, and this was not
included in the CSIM simulation. The disagreement
between load figures for the 1553 local bus are similar in
nature to the MDM usage figures, and the difference
may be due to the same cause since the usage of the
MDM and the local bus are closely related.
B_. Conclusions
The CSIM simulation being described in this document
is in general qualitative agreement with the MDSSC
simulation in pointing out potential bottlenecks in the
DMS: the Application EDP and, to a lesser degree, the
MDM processors. The exact utilization levels do not
agree precisely, particularly for the MDM processors,
which disagree by a factor of two. A discrepancy of this
magnitude is not unexpected given the lack of detailed
knowledge concerning the processing model of the DMS
available for the current study. If more information about
the processing model used in the MDSSC Report were
made available, the causes of the discrepancies could be
investigated.
The amount of specific detail available for describing the
workload permits a static analysis of the workload model
to accurately predict the utilization levels experienced in
the simulation. For this reason, the utilization figures
alone could have been established without the simula-
tion. Of course, other performance factors, including
response times, delays, and maximum queue lengths, can
be predicted with an accurate simulation. However, the
current detail level of this study makes such data ques-
tionable. Better models of processor and operating
system execution would be required to extract accurate
values from this simulation.
C. Advanced Automation for SSF
The requirements of four examples of system functions
that critically depend on the capability of the DMS are
discussed here: the ECLSS, the PMAD, the AANMS,
and the Flight Telerobotic Servicer (FTS).
C.1. The Environmental Control Life Support System
(ECLSS)
The goal of ECLSS is to utilize closed loop life support
technology to minimize resupply and return logistic
penalties. Maintaining respirable atmosphere, potable
and hygiene water, and emergency operation are its
primary duties. The availability of on-orbit computa-
tional resources will impact the overall level of automa-
tion, as well as the number of sensors and effectors.
Complete closure of the ECLSS loop is optimal, but has
been deferred until later in the SSF program lifetime.
ECLSS is designed to operate in a range of automation
capability--from having a crew to provide corrective
and preventative maintenance, manual overrides, non-
critical fault isolation, and redundancy management to
full automation. Onboard computers are responsible for
performing most process control functions, interactions
with other systems, fault detection functions, and criti-
cality 10RU fault isolation. If proper manual overrides
are inhibited by the crew, the ECLSS can perform
emergency reconfiguration or take appropriate response
to an emergency, such as suppressing a fire. Considering
the life critical nature of the ECLSS, most automated
functions that support it are critical.
Designed to be primarily automated on-orbit, the break-
down between ground and space processing has not been
completely defined. However, the effect of the power,
weight, and cost enforcements is leaving little choice to
the system designers. The currently allocated resources
for each subsystem have been reduced so much that only
real time critical functions are to be housed onboard. All
functions that can be achieved on-ground must be done
so. This is also with the intent that eventual upgrades
will take place and some of these functions will migrate
back on board SSF.
The current on board ECLSS supervisory system design,
using soft real time, utilizes a total of I SDP worth of
processing power and memory size (4 MIPS/4 MB).
That is, although several SDPs are shared among
subsystems, the total power and memory capacity total
1 SDP. The hard real time system is distributed among
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approximately20MDMsandthecompositer quired
capabilityisequivalentto 10to12fullyloadedMDMs.
Thefaultsensors'aredirectlyconnectedtotheMDMs.It
isonlythesupervisorsectionthatinterfaceswiththe
DMS.Thisis forinformationstorage,crewupdates,and
furtherdataanalysis.
Thereasonforautomationisthatmorecanbeachieved
withless.AlthoughthecurrentdesignoftheECLSS
ensuresnoughsensorsareinplacetoachievewhatis
critical,therearenoleakdetectionsensors.Tocompen-
sateforthis,theadvancedautomationprogramwill
analyzethecharacteristicsoffailuresdownstreaminthe
modelbaseandthendetecttheleakoriginor
approximatevicinity.
TheautomatedECLSSconsistsofrule-basedfault-
detectionalgorithmsforbaselineonorbitECLSS
regenerativesystems,withinitialoperationalcapability
model-baseddiagnosingontheground.Themodelbased
diagnosissystemswillmoveto flight software when
computer resources on board permit. The design of the
ECLSS automation system is that the rule-based fault
detection algorithms be on board and complemented
with model based diagnosis autonomy in the ECLSS
ground support center. The primary limitation to
achieving this is a lack of computational resources in
orbit and on the ground. The computational resources of
SSF must be upgraded to allow migration of high fidelity
automatic fault diagnosis software on board. The on
board fault detection algorithm wilt meet the Ada task
interface.
Water drinkability would be rapidly assured through
automation of the water quality monitor output. This
requires real time processing of chemical and/or micro-
bial analysis in the life support control system. On board
processing would require fast symbolic and/or neural net
processing.
Fo: the current lab system, the advanced automation
ECLSS is using Sun Rise, which is eventually being
ported to Sun 386i and SunOS using KATE, ART/Ada,
Lisp and TAE+. The software is a mix of 80% symbolic
and 20% numeric code where 500 KB is the size for the
detection and 4 MB for the diagnosis. In-orbit applica-
tions have been limited to fault detection because the
model-based fault diagnosis requires more processing
capabilities than are available. The primary impact of
this is that fault reasoning is deferred to the ground. A
large sacrifice in fault tolerance of the system, the
turnaround time from detecting a fault to its isolation and
recovery would be delayed by twice the amount of time
it takes to transmit over the TDRSS link. in a critical
situation, such as a gas leak in the respirable air in the
HAB/LAB, this extra time could be intolerable.
The major software hooks and hardware scars necessary
for evolution to a more autonomous ECLSS have been
identified. The advanced subsystem FDIR requires com-
ponent sensors to be available from the RODB within
1 sec, allowing the subsystem's control loop latency of
5 to 10 sec. This provides real time fault detection and
fault preventive reconfiguration to use 3 to 8 sec, with
communication to the subassembly monitoring process
taking 2 sec. A software process location transparency
(dynamic memory allocation) is also called for. This was
explicitly removed from baseline. The automation effi-
ciency would be increased by the use of model-based
reasoning tools like KATE and ART/Ada for early
design knowledge capture. It is recommended that these
tools be added to the SSF software support environment.
This model-based reasoning approach to subsystem
FDIR would allow minimal use of explicit leak detection
sensors by identifying leaks using the baseline process
control sensors. The result would be the same, yet would
require fewer on board resources.
For the current laboratory system, which is a subset of
the initial design, 4 MIPS with 4 MB are sufficient. By
nature of the problem, it is a slow system and it works.
The turnaround time on sensor sample analysis is, at
worst case, minutes, thus there is enough time to wait for
commands from the ground based control center. With
increased use of the station, the demands on the system
will grow. This also does not account for on board fault
handling beyond detection. There is not enough capabil-
ity available to meet this growth. To support timely
inclusion of this automation technology, symbolic
processing in a real time environment, dynamic memory
allocation and much more memory are necessary.
C.2. Power Management and Distribution (PMAD)
Another system targeted for evolutionary upgrades with
increased automation is the PMAD system. The PMAD
Automation Evolution project is promoting the operation
of a highly autonomous, user-supportive PMAD system
for the SSF HAB/LAB modules with a fully integrated
user override capability. Automated aspects of the
system include immediate power system safeguarding,
short term load shedding, limit checking and reporting,
and redundant load switching. Also automated are
schedule implementation, fault detection, fault isolation,
fault diagnosis, scheduling load prioritization, and
dynamic scheduling. The critical functions of the PMAD
system are implementation of normal operation, FDIR,
scheduling, and load prioritization. Though initially
targeted to support the SSF from the ground, it will
eventually be installed on board.
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ThecurrentlaboratorysystemusesCommonLispand
CommonLispObjectSystemontheSymbolicsand
Motorola68010computers.Tobetterreflecttheend
environmentoftheSSF,it isbeingportedto
Solbourne5/501andQ-max386.Initialobjectivesofthe
projectcanbemetwithhardwarecurrentlyused,butas
thehardwaresystemisredefinedandtrimmedtomore
closelyresembler sourcesavailableforusewithSSF,
thesacrificesareimminent.Morecomputingpowerat
thesymboliclevelisneeded.Withmorethan 50 thou-
sand lines of code, of which 45% are symbolic, dynamic
memory allocation must be allowed. To meet the current
processing requirements, a total of 20 VAX MIPS is
required for the Solboume, 2 MIPS for the 386 and
about 5 MIPS for the Symbolics. Also necessary is
0.5 MB memory at the controllers and 2 to 3 MB at
higher levels. If a symbolic processing machine is not
available, the capabilities it provides must be, otherwise
a new system design is necessary.
C.3. Advanced Automation Network Monitoring
System
The Advanced Automation Methodology Project is the
development of an engineering methodology for
advanced automation systems for use in the SSF pro-
gram guidelines. The two independent systems in this
project are the AANMS and the Recovery Procedure
Selection Application. Upon completion, each system
will be integrated into existing SSF test beds.
This involves the development of a network monitoring
system capable of intelligent fault monitoring of FDDI-
based networks. Designed to provide predictable, hard-
deadline scheduling in real time within the SSF con-
straints, the total time to respond to any fault is limited to
within 1 sec. This system will automatically detect,
isolate, and diagnose network faults based on data pass=
ing on the network. The network monitor is important
for telerobotics and docking-critical systems. Therefore,
it is necessary to identify bottlenecks quickly so that the
system can be reconfigured with minimal loss. The
AANMS also provides a flexible user interface for semi-
automated systems. The primary focus is to prove func-
tionality, so hardware is not currently a prime concern.
When the system concept is proven it will be ported to
state-of-the-art system technology.
The driving requirement for porting systems to the SSF
is to use COTS systems. However, the technology
required to successfully accomplish this job is not
available. The current laboratory system is based on a
Silicon Graphics experiment with NetVisualizer.
conventional network monitoring software, running on
their 16 MIPS personal IRIS 4D/25 workstation. This
software was able to process only 4% of the tested FDDI
traffic. Yet this is for data capture and extraction
functions only. Processing of this data would require
additional capability. This performance is not in the
baseline design, nor is it currently identified in the
upgrades. The memory requirements for storing and
analyzing the data are prohibitive. The FDDI will
generate (at most) 12.5 MB/sec of data. For data capture,
this implies 40 MB of RAM are required for each 3 sec.
Other functions are projected to require around 24 MB
of RAM. This implies a need for aminimum of 64 MB.
Clearly the AANMS concept is beyond the current state-
of-the-art for the DMS.
C.4. Flight Telerobotic Servicer firs)
One presentation at the Computational Requirements
Assessment Workshop, July 9-I 1, 1990, was given by
Stan White of Martin Marietta on the FTS Data
Management Processing System (DMPS). White
indicated that the prime computational driver is the
critical path "around the loop" flow. This system
involves the workstation where the telerobot is located
and controlled. The workstation has a hand controller
that feeds commands to the 80386/387 clocked at
16 MHz with 256 KB RAM. This is linked via 1553 bus
to the telerobot control computer. The original
requirement for the FTS was that the throughput be
2.25 MIPS, 2 MB memory, 32 bits floating point,
running Ada on a 1553 bus. The baseline of the 80386
fits these requirements and the mission has not realized
sacrifices due to this, However, the FTS program is
undergoing rescoping/changes and the selected SDP
cannot fulfill the requirements. This is due to the growth
in the around-the-loop timing, due in part to the
increased algorithm complexity, better software
implementation definition, and reduced SDP
performance (3.1 MIPS).
The current plan for evolution is that a margin of 50%
processor usage and 35% RAM is provided; however,
these do not address around-the-loop timing. Spare bus
nodes are available for additional processors, but parallel
processing does not improve around the loop timing--
the algorithms used here are serial.
The DMPS architecture study, initiated by Goddard
Space Flight Center, indicated future requirements of
200 Hz around-the-loop (versus 50 Hz) with increased
vision processing in line with increased autonomy and
gaphics simulation for path planning preview and
training. These capabilities cannot be achieved by the
80386. Without a design with a faster system, these are
not evolutions that can be realized quickly without suffi-
cient redesign in space. The FTS would probably remain
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asit isdeployed, with little or no autonomy, initially or
evolutionarily.
It is recommended that, in the baseline design, a faster
computational platform, with increased performance by
a factor of six, multiple CPUs (at least four), and spare
slots for growth be used. As previously stated, no sacri-
fices have yet been realized to fit to the chosen platform,
but control algorithms, software, and hardware reviews
are conducted to squeeze out performance. So far in this
project, the primary lesson learned is that the perfor-
mance margin, initially set at 25% for around-the-loop
control algorithm growth, is too small. This is being
compensated for by targeting Ada RTE to bare machine,
thus eliminating the operating system overhead. Greater
emphasis must be placed on performance margins.
D. Integrated Design Constraints
The latest trend in technology and business philosophy
points the way toward fully extensible, mission-adaptive
computer platforms. Such "platform" designs offer
advanced inter-component, inter-board, and inter-system
connectivity. They allow program-specific processor
modularity, while remaining open to a continuous stream
of increasingly advanced common components and
modules with minimal mission disruption and risk. Due
to its long mission life, the SSF program demands
component design decisions based on the ability to
enhance minimum cost for maintenance and upgrade in
the long run. Its DMS can serve as a test case for using
open system "platform" design.
When considering the ability of hardware/software
technology to evolve in performance/function over the
long term, many sub-component factors must be consid-
ered. It is only at this subsurface level, that these
ingrained "evolvability and compatible scalability" traits
are visible. Evaluation at this sub-component/sub-issue
level is both critical and difficult.
Figure D-1 introduces a discussion of eleven major
"architectural dimensions" critical in determining the
long-range "scalability" of any proposed system design.
Constraint in any category affects the whole. The first
two categories relate to issues of connectivity, the next
six describe critical processor and component technolo_:'
issues. The ninth deals with "open systems" business and
cost factors; the tenth relates to software considerations
and the eleventh, full-system reliability characteristics.
Each system component must be able to evolve through
the full spectrum of each column in order to survive. The
difficulty in designing a long-range scalable system can
be better appreciated when one considers the complexity
in trying to satisfy the constraints represented in these
eleven issues.
Long-Term "Architectural Scalability Filter"
Figure D- 1. Integrated design constraints for computer systems.
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D.I. Connectivity Architecture
The connectivity architecture is the foundation of a
computer system. Many levels of connectivity must be
addressed (fig. D-1). Without sufficient/balanced
connectivity from top to bottom, it is difficult to attain
either optimal present performance or long-range
performance expansion.
D.1.1- Recent innovations in the chip- and board-level
connectivity domains are too numerous for detailed
description in this report. These innovations are closely
related to the underlying chip technology being consid-
ered in section D.7. Because each technology (CMOS,
GaAs, etc.) exhibits different performance and gate/
transistor densities, different methods of board- and
chip-level connectivity are required. Complicating these
density/connectivity equations still further are the addi-
tional baseline architectural design factors outlined in
sections D.2-D.8.
D.1.2- Standards committees generally focus on the bus,
backplane, network, and peripheral levels. Major inno-
vations and significant trends are occurring in these
areas.
D.1.2.1. The terms "bus" and "backplane" are often
thought of as synonymous. They connote specific inter-
board connectivity wiring designs. For the purpose of
this report, "bus" will be used to denote the high band-
width, proprietary board interconnect designs found
throughout the industry. "Backplane" is used to describe
board interconnect designs specifically defined and
generally accepted within the standards community.
Major cost savings have been realized by both govern-
ment and industry from the advent of standard back-
planes such as VME and Multibus II. Buses, on the other
hand, are still quite common and tend to be motivated by
two factors: (l) a realistic need to connect boards (such
as processor and memory boards) at bandwidth levels
above those possible on standard backplanes, and (2) the
widespread desire of many computer manufacturers and
integrators to maintain proprietary performance advan-
tage. Between these philosophies are found widely
accepted, but still proprietary, standards. These are
discussed in section F.9.
The standards community have establish a new class
of scalable, high bandwidth backplane standards." These
efforts have primarily been motivated by a universal
realization that present backplane standards are reaching
the limits of their ability to sustain higher levels of
performance. The most visibly successful of the new,
scalable standards efforts has been the IEEE P896. I
FutureBus+. IEEE, U.S. Navy NGCR and SPAWAR
programs, and Pentagon standards bodies have already
accepted it. Both the VME and Multibus II international
trade associations have said that this standard will be
their next generation. Intel, DEC, Motorola, and
HP/Apollo have also adopted it, and many others are
reportedly nearing announcement. The U.S. Navy has
already contracted with three different defense contrac-
tors to build six different processor boards for Future-
Bus+. From sheer market acceptance criteria alone,
NASA should seriously consider FutureBus+ as a future
backplane standard throughout its programs. Techni-
cally, the FutureBus+ specification is impressive:
• The physics of the backplane has been thoroughly
assessed (power requirements, microwave properties,
etc.).
• It is asynchronous, allowing boards to run at
different speeds, including new generations of
compatible upgrades over time.
• It is performance scalable, from 1130MB/sec to
3.2 Gbytes/sec.
• It is data width scalable, from 32, to 64, to 128, to
256 bits wide.
• Multiple application specific integrated circuit
(ASIC) vendors are already committed to building
interface ASICs.
• Both VME and Multibus II are designed to
interface with existing boards without redesign.
• It has full parallel processing and multiprocessing
protocol, cache coherency, and processor synchro-
nization mechanisms in its design.
• It supports both real time (priority based) and
fairness (equal opportunity) contention arbitration
schema.
• It adopts two intercompatible transmission
methods to allow full system performance
optimization.
D'1.2.2. One of the most advanced innovations in
connectivity architectures is the combination of gigabit
fiber optics transmission media with gigabit circuit
switches. While these are typically viewed as inter-
system network developments, their reach extends far
beyond. The first level of extension is the ability of this
gigabit media to connect multiple types of backplanes
together into one inter-operative system. Initial plans of
companies in regard to backplane interface are in the
following order: (1) Nubus (Macintosh and NEXT),
(2) VME bus (Sun, MIPS, embedded real time proces-
sors, etc.), (3) AThus (IBM PCs), Microchannel
(IBM PS/2), (4) Multibus U (embedded processors), and
(5) FutureBus+. The second phase of development leads
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toadomainthatmightbecalled"bus-less"or
"backplane-less"ystemdesign.Bus-lessdesignscould
offerbenefitsinheterogeneousandhomogeneousmulti-
processing,long-termevoivability,missionadaptive
modularity,andreliability.Thesedesignsshouldbe
evaluatedinregardtominimizationofcost,power,and
weightwhilemaximizingperformance,functionality,
reliabilityand"openness."
AT&T,NetworkSystems,andAncorGigabitswitch
offeringshouldbestudiedaswellasAmericanNational
StandardsInstitute(ANSI)Fiberchannel0, 1,2andscal-
ablecoherentinterfacefiber-opticonnectivitystan-
dards.Advancedprotocols,uchasXTP(Protocol
Engines,Inc.)andoptimizedTCP/IP,shouldalsobe
studied.FromanASIChardwarestandpoint,protocol
transparency,processor/coprocessorappealability,power
requirements,andspacequalifiabilityshouldalsobe
studied.
Linearbuses,whetherbackplanessuchasMuitibus
II ornetworkssuch as Ethernet, must constantly deal
with collision detection and arbitration overheads. Each
node must delay a round-trip propagation time (after it
sees the last bit of the preceding packet) to ensure that a
new packet does not interfere with a preceding packet.
Ring structures, such as the IBM token ring or FDDI,
also suffer from similar delay of at least one round trip
propagation delay before any node can receive a token to
transmit another packet. For circuit switches (such as
crossbars or omega-net-like space switches) the round
trip propagation delay is required to perform the initial
point-to-point connection, but this is performed only
once. Subsequent connections can be established while a
current message is being transmitted. This property
could be viewed as a connectivity analog to computa-
tional pipelining. It offers the opportunity of board
interconnectivity at rates far exceeding today's standard
backplanes, in any combination, at physical locations far
beyond that which is possible on buses and backplanes.
D.1.2.3. From a peripheral connectivity standpoint,
many other new, advanced, scalable standards are form-
ing. The general progression path is from storage module
device to small computer system interface (SCSI) to
intelligent peripheral interface 1, 2, 3 to high perfor-
mance peripheral interface (HPPI). All are now in pro-
duction in the commercial market and should be studied
for their space applicability. Cooperative research efforts
could be easily invoked involving such projects as
GSFC's configurable high rate processing system, which
utilizes the ANSI IEEE HPPI interface, and advanced
laser disk and laser communications projects such as the
LaRC information sciences experiment system project.
D.1.2.4. Lower speed connectivity (such as 1553B
and IEEE 802.4) and ground link communication criteria
are another layer of connectivity that must be advanced
for future mission applications. These areas are critical
to decisions such as the distribution of computation
between ground and space. Similar developments of
advanced connectivity are being studied in the Defense
Advanced Research Project Agency, Department of
Defense, Department of Energy, Strategic Defense
Initiative Office, U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, and
intelligence communities.
D.2. Memory Hierarchy
Items in the memory hierarchy column in figure D-I deal
with the many levels of consideration that must be given
in regard to keeping data operands and instructions close
to functional units. As stated before, it does not matter
how fast a processor is if it cannot send and receive data
at a rate equivalent to its processing capabilities. The
connectivity architecture described in section D. 1. is the
media on which the data is conveyed. The memory
hierarchy, however, serves a critical function in the
conservation of over-all, system-wide bandwidth by
minimizing the need for electrically distant data
transmission. Insufficiency in either local memory
capacity or performance will be felt throughout the
system and must be studied for each candidate archi-
tecture in great detail. Additional memory features are
also critical to long-range evolvability. Vector proces-
sors require a global memory that is organized into
"banks." If operands are to be fetched from random
locations, memory access facilities such as _ather and
"scatter" could be critical. If parallel processing
techniques are used, coherency mechanisms must be
included in the design to ensure that no processor is
working with stale data that it thinks is current. Register
structure, especially in RISC processors that are typically
equipped with many local registers, can be quite critical
in performing high-speed task switching in a real time
environment. The memory hierarchies below the surface
of any processor/system candidate are critical to its
ability to evolve over time and must be studied before
selection is made.
D.3. Instruction Set Architecture
This dimension of scalability includes (fig. D-l): CISC,
Medium Instruction Set Computers (MISC)--also called
complexity-reduced instruction set processors (CRISP),
RISC, and Tagged-RISC (RISC processors with addi-
tional data-tagging facilities for use in artificial intelli-
gence applications). Recent trends have been in the
direction of the arrow in figure D- 1. IBM is generally
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creditedwithinventionoftheRISCarchitectureswith
thedevelopmentof itsearly801processorchip.RISC
processorshavebeendevelopedbecausehardware
implementationfcomplexinstructionsslowsdownthe
clockrateoftheentireprocessorandconsumesprecious
chiparea.Circuitpathsonpresentdaychipsurfacesare
reachingthepointwheretheyareliterallymolecules
wide.Reductionoffeaturesizeshasplateaued.Simi-
larly,molecularpurityoflarge-scalechipsurfacesi
extremelydifficultomaintain.Consequently,chiparea
isscarce.InCMOS,forexample,thereisonlyabout
1cm2toworkwith.InECLandGaAs,thereisevenless
surfacearea.Processordesignswithalargenumberof,
orhighlycomplexinstructionsareaninefficientuseof
scarcechiparea.RISC,reducesboththenumberand
complexityofinstructions.Asaresult,moreofthe
workingchipareaisdedicatedtothemostfrequently
usedfunctionsandoperandscanbekeptclosetofunc-
tionalunits(byusingalargeregistersset).RISCinstruc-
tionsaretypicallysimple,symmetrical,ndeasily
decodableb causeoftheirfixedlength.Instructionsare
therebystreamlinedtoachieveaninstructionexecution
rateatorbelowoneclockcycleperinstruction.Exten-
siveuseofpipeliningcanalsobemade.Anotherperfor-
mancenhancementcomesfromthelargelocalregister
file,whichmayreduceaccesstoglobalmemory.Relia-
bilitydesiresarealsoservedbytheRISCarchitectures
on two fronts:
1. Microcode is generally eliminated in RISC
architectures, moving complex functionality to the
compilers and libraries. This allows the verification and
validation functions to occur in a more visible way.
2. Reliability causes are also served by the simpler, more
efficient hardware.
CISC processors, because of their high gate/transistor
density are hard to scale in performance. Design simula-
tions and fabrications technologies are very complex.
Further, high gate/transistor densities also prevent easy
transition to faster (but lower density) technologies, such
as emitter-coupled logic (ECL), GaAs, and high electron
mobility transfer (HEMT).
In summary, the instruction set architecture is one of the
major contributors to chip complexity. More gates or
transistors on a given chip means less power per gate,
reduced driving strength per gate, and, therefore, low-
ered reliability. Also, large circuit sizes often result in
longer and more complex signal delays. These types of
problems inevitably reduce operating speed, yield, and
reliability while increasing design complexity, cost, and
development time. MISC is simply between CISC and
RISC. Some RISC processors, however, are aimed at the
commercial markets where high levels of integration can
be translated into simple economies of mass market
scale. In addition, for space applications, high levels of
integration may actually be counterproductive. Proces-
sors may include an on-chip cache, which has no EDAC
circuitry and therefore should be disabled for space or
life-critical applications (the i486 is a good example).
The result is wasted space and power for the additional
external cache chips. On-chip memory management
already included may also not be well suited for highly
robust real time applications. Memory access character-
istics of the memory management unit (MMU) might
have multiuser "fairness doctrine" rules built in that may
conflict with a real time program desiring full,
uninterrupted control.
D.4. Processor Modularity
The processor is composed of many functional units
(fig. D-l). The nominal list includes:
1. The integer unit that typically decodes all instructions
and processes the non-floating-point instructions.
2. The floating-point controller, floating-point functional
unit, and floating-point registers.
3. The cache controller and cache static RAM, and the
MMU.
Additional processor units and facilities such as local
memory interfaces, coprocessor interface pinouts, and
bus/backplane interfaces may all be integrated onto a
single, high density chip. High density integration will, if
designed specifically for the application, yield high
potential levels of performance. It will also yield
economies of scale if the markets are sufficient in size to
pay for the heavy cost of development. On the other
hand, in military specifications (MILSPEC) or space-
qualified applications, high-levels of integration may be
counterproductive. Discrete components allow the
designer to more easily tailor the specific processor
characteristic to one or more specific applications. With
individual units, per-chip gate counts are lower, allowing
far easier transition to faster, but less dense technologies.
Individual units may also be replaced more easily as unit
innovations (or corrections) occur.
D.5. Special Facilities
Additional design features such as real time facilities,
parallel processing, pipelining adaptations, memory
access facilities, coprocessor interfaces (for such things
as signal processing, image processing, etc.), can be
critical to functional flexibility and performance
evolvab.ility in NASA applications (fig. D-1). Both the
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capabilitiesandtrendsofspecialfacilitieshouldbe
assessedbyNASAforitscandidateprocessors.
D.6. Processor Architecture
This dimension describes the character of the specific
machine instructions and the interplay between
individual instructions and processor units (fig. D-1). In
scalar processing, a single instruction performs a single
operation generating a single result. In vector processing,
a single instruction performs its operation on a series of
similar input operands, producing a series of pipelined
results much in the same fashion as the individual steps
of a factory production line. Vector processing is
computationally efficient because after an instruction is
decoded once, volumes of data can be read in from main
memory and processed at clock-rate. Multi-processing is
the use of multiple processors for many different
programs. Parallel processing combines multiple
processors to speedup an individual computation.
Parallel operations can occur at the instruction level
(often called superscalar, wide instruction word or
dataflow), the loop, or subroutine level. Systolic tech-
niques tend to pump instruction, loop, or subroutine
result sets through a globally networked scheme (like a
n-dimensional production line) until final results are
created for all operations. In the parallel cases, instruc-
tions can be either scalar or vector operations. Instruc-
tions can be tailored to work with integer, floating-point,
or logical/symbolic information formats.
Multiprocessors require high bandwidths, low latency
CPUs, buses, memory, and I/O connectivity. Parallel
processing requires facilities that prevent race-
conditions, memory-locking, as well as cache coherency.
For example, prevention of two processors storing to the
same cell in memory at the same time. Test-and-set
instructions help implement semaphores. Memory lock-
ing instructions can force momentary sequentiality of
instructions so that operations do not occur in the wrong
order. Cache coherency measures prevent data from
going "stale" in separate caches---one processor being
unaware of actions that occurred in another processor on
its data items. Coprocessors, such as vector floating-
point, vector integer (imaging), and signal processors
(processors tailored to perform fast fourier transform
(FFT) and convolutions at high rates), are highly depen-
dent on the interfaces to the processors that invoke them.
These interfaces can be at either chip, board, or system
network level and will produce efficiency levels in direct
relation to the nature of the connectivity paths. Some
processor chip sets provide coprocessor interfaces
(pinouts) at the chip level and are, therefore, most effi-
cient and flexible in regard to the type of coprocessor.
D.7. Chip Technology
The chip technology column in figure D-1 is organized
according to raw technology speed of operation. Tran-
sition from CMOS gate arrays to GaAs produces at least
a ten-fold transparent increase in performance. The less
dense and complex the instruction set architecture, the
easier the transition through the full spectrum of
technologies. Digital GaAs technologies are just now
reaching 20 thousand gate densities. The highest device
density that has been reported for advanced radiation-
hardened (VHSIC Phase IT) technologies to date, devel-
oped by IBM, TRW, and Honeywell, is around 3.5 mil-
lion transistors. A recent projection of the gate densities
for 386 successors showed the i486 processor with
1.2 million transistors, the i586 with 4 million, the
686 with 22 million, and the 786 at 100 million. At least
two RISC processors, on the other hand, exhibit transis-
tor densities in the range of 50-75 thousand. NASA
should carry out an in-depth study regarding the radia-
tion and SEU resistance of the many oncoming tech-
nologies. From there, an analysis of candidate CISC,
MISC and RISC processor architectures should be per-
formed in regard to the gate/transistor densities required
for all processor-related components. This will give an
indication of the optimum combinations of chip technol-
ogy and processor architecture in regard to long-term
scalability.
D.8. Chip Robustness
As stated in the previous section, different chip tech-
nologies exhibit varying levels of robustness in regard to
being able to transition the full spectrum of this
column--from commercial grade, to "rugged" to
MILSPEC to radiation-hardened to space (SEU) quali-
fied. The next paragraph also describes the many bene-
fits of open architectures in multi-sourcing and multi-
source fabrication line availability. Some of the chip
foundries building open-systems processors, for
example, already have at least radiation-hardened
fabrication facilities.
D.9. Open Systems
Industry is quickly moving from the old, competitive,
"proprietary" business model to the cooperative "open
systems" business model. At the surface there is still
much confusion and hyperbole---everyone is claiming to
be "open." NASA should do all it can to foster, shape,
and take advantage of the open systems model. The key
difference between a true open systems company and
one that only claims to be open is found in the licensing
documents that should be signed by those who wish to
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usetheopentechnologydesignrights.Essentially,there
aretwoclasses:(1)an"architecture"license,and(2)a
"component"license.
Thefalseopensystemscompanywillonlyofferan
architecturelicense,whichallowsthosewhosignit the
fighttobuildsystemsusingthe(single-source)hipset.
In thismanner,thecompanywhoownstheproprietary
fightstothetechnologycanfullycontrolboththebehav-
iorofthelicenseeandthepriceofthecomponents.An
analogalsoexistsinthesoftwareworld.Controlinthis
caseismaintainedbysource-rightlicensing.Manycom-
panieswillportprogramstoamachine,butwillnot
licensethesourcerights.Othersareopenandwill
licensethesourcerights--butinthesoftwareworldthey
arefewandfarbetween.
A trueopensystemscompanyofferscomponentlicense
alongwiththearchitecturelicense.Thisallowsmultiple
chipvendorstobuildinstruction-compatibleversionsof
aprocessor,forexample,thatcreatestwodistinct
benefitsfortheusercommunity.Thefirstrelatestothe
costbenefitsthatresultfrommultiplesourcesforagiven
partandfromahealthylevelofcompetition.Thesecond
benefitofmultiplesourcingismoretechnical.One
licenseemighthavecentereditsexpertiseinbuilding
extremelyow-cost,high-volumepartsusingCMOS
standardcells,whileanothercanbringitsexpertisein
building MILSPEC, radiation-hardened, and space quali-
fied chipsets to the government market. A third vendor
may have the ability to add high-performance features
such as "super-scalar" (instruction-level parallel) to the
chipset. The owner of the fights benefits by expanding
his market into domains they could never address alone.
On the other side of the coin, the chip foundries and
vendors benefit by being able to use a processor that has
already gained popularity in the commercial market and
does not have to reinvent the entire set of OS, languages,
and third party applications.
MIPS and Sun are examples of open systems companies.
There are five different vendors licensed to build com-
patible chipsets for MIPS, and eight vendors for Sun's
scalable processor architecture. Motorola and Intel, on
the other hand, are only single sources with some
exceptions.
D.IO. Software Architecture
From the software standpoint, developers in the real time
arena (such as aircraft avionics) have found that there are
two different sets of real time requirements: (1) the
development environment, and (2) the embedded
environment. They concluded that UNIX offers many
positive facilities for the development environment,
especially in its ability to combine design, development,
diagnosis, debug, and documentation tool sets. The
embedded environment, however, often requires highly
optimized kernel OS functions which a UNIX-based
system cannot offer due to its innate code mass at the
kernel level. If the kernel OS will fit in ROM, instead of
2 MB of memory, both power minimization and
performance/reliability maximization causes are served.
Smaller OS kernels offer higher performance in priority
control, interrupt handling, task-switch overheads, and
dispatch latency facilities, as well as raw program per-
formance. Additionally, these real time kernel OSs have
demonstrated that they can more easily and efficiently
invoke the newer and more innovative language con-
structs (such as Ada Tasking) in performing real time
task management than is possible by retailoring the far
more massive UNIX kernel structure. A recent trend
among these real time kernel OSs is to bridge the gap
between the development (UNIX) and embedded
(RTOS) environments. This path allows the direct
linkage of the two, via standard UNIX socket software
interfaces, remote procedure call communications tools,
I/O calls, and even the same memory management
routines.
These UNIX facilities, and the third party applications
that run on them, along with standard UNIX computer
aided software engineering (CASE)-Iike tools and
debugging facilities (using UNIX connectivity tools) are
available for on-line, real time diagnostics and debug-
ging purposes to ease verification and validation. Full
evaluation of the more prevalent of these real time kernel
OSs should be performed for both present and
evolutionary purposes.
E. Fault Tolerant/Redundancy Management
Analysis
This section describes the analysis process and modeling
techniques used in support of the DMS evolution report.
The effort was based on a system modeling technique
called Digraph Matrix Analysis (DMA). The process,
two system modeling techniques, and an example of the
use of each technique is presented. The results of these
investigations are useful in determining single- and
double-points of failure in the DMS, as well as
predicting the performance of various system
E.1. Evaluation Approaches and Criteria
E.I.1. Evaluation criteria- The general failure
tolerance requirements for SSF systems (ref. 17,
para_aph 3.1.10.1.1) are:
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Systems functions which are essential for crew
safety or Freedom Station survival shall be
designed to be two-failure tolerant as a mini-
mum (except primary structure and pressure
vessels in rupture mode) and shall be
restorable on orbit to the original failure
tolerance level. During initial assembly and
periods of maintenance, these functions shall
be single-failure tolerant as a minimum.
Systems functions which are essential for criti-
cal mission support shall be designed to be
single-failure tolerant as a minimum and on-
orbit restorable. Safety detection, monitoring,
or control functions shall also be designed to
be single-failure tolerant as a minimum and
on-orbit restorable. Noncritical functions shall
be designed to fail in a safe mode and be on-
orbit restorable. Functional redundancy
required to provide this failure tolerance may
be common or uncommon and may be
achieved by considering the space station
manned base as an integrated system.
E.2. Failure Tolerance/Redundancy Management
Process
An FT/RM evaluation process is described in the FT/RM
Design Guide (ref. 18). Since SSF is a long-duration
facility, the FT/RM analysis is focused on the functional
requirements of integrated systems. The FT/RM process
is initiated with the definition of integrated system func-
tions and assignment of criticality (ref. 17, table 3-6).
Once the functions are defined and their criticality estab-
lished, the design is analyzed to verify its consistency
and completeness. The redundancy requirements
corresponding to each criticality category are also given
in table 3-6 (ref. 17). These requirements, along with a
function's concurrency and period of criticality, are
examined in the functional criticality analysis. The next
step in the FT/RM process is determination of the design
requirements for each system and element in order to
implement FT/RM. Before the design is placed under
configuration control, its fault tolerance is verified.
The directed graph (digraph) models for several critical
functions are currently being constructed and reviewed.
A more detailed description of the digraph approach and
several modeling examples are given in the next section.
E.3. Modeling Techniques
One widely used technique for modeling complex
systems is combinatorial models. DMA is the combina-
torial modeling approach used by WP-2. The approach is
based on the representation of the flow of effects
between components of a system as a di_aph. Digraphs
include logical connectives such as and-gates and or-
gates that allow the representation of redundant compo-
nents and multiple dependencies. Once the digraphs are
constructed, they can be processed to provide a designer
with information including the components whose
failure will cause failure of the entire system, called
singletons, and pairs of components whose combined
failure will cause failure of the system, called double-
tons. With a similar procedure, the analyst can also study
tripletons (triples of components whose failure will
cause system failure). When available, probabilistic
information can be added to the model and reliability
estimates calculated.
ARC had developed a translation pro_am to convert
digraphs into another widely used reliability graph
model called fault trees. Since other work packages are
using fault tree models, this is one way to make the
models as versatile as possible. The results produced by
reducing a fault tree, called cut sets, are equivalent to the
singletons, doubletons, and tripletons provided by DMA.
Fault trees may also be used in reliability studies if
probabilistic data are available.
These combinatorial models are quite useful for the
redundancy analysis of the DMS, and a great deal of
insight can be gained from a very simple, top level
model. This process is illustrated in the next section.
When a system is designed to dynamically reconfigure
as is the case with the DMS, the combinatorial models
are not appropriate for the reliability analysis. Markov
models are a popular modeling approach used in the
fault tolerant computing community for systems utilizing
hot and cold sparing and dynamic reconfiguration when
failures occur in the system. An example of this
approach is also given in the next section.
E.3,1. Model limitations- The current model is limited
to analysis of the optical network, RCs, and SDPs with
successful operation being defined by the ability of the
SDPs to communicate across the network. This level of
detail is adequate for the current phase of DMS design
when redundancy analysis is the key focus. More detail
can be added to the model later.
E.3.2. Redundancy analysis of the token ring net-
work- A top level model of the DMS can be developed
from the simplified schematic shown in figure E-1. The
dual-fiber optic ring, dual RCs, and critical SDPs are
indicated in the diagram. Each RC is connected to one
ring. To better illustrate details of the communication
path at a site representative of every site on the network,
an expanded view of one site on the ring is shown in
figure E-2. The naming convention used in the diagram,
46
Core Core Core Core
RC #2A RC #14A RC #8A RC #6A
Core Core Core Core
RC #7A RC #9A RC #15A RC #1A
Figure E- 1. Simpfified schematic diagram of the DMS at PMC.
Figure E-2. Expanded view of site 2.
SDP XA and SDP XB, and also RC (indicated by a
circle) XA and RC XB, represent a primary, A, and a
backup (hot or cold), B, component.
The failure modes and effects analysis (ref. 21) focuses
on two main modes of failure: failure of the RC due to
power supply failure, and network media failures due to
breaks in the fiber and/or connectors. If it is possible for
an RC to fail as a unit, then FDDI standard reconfigu-
ration procedures after such a failure would result in
isolation of all nodes connected to it. This situation is
illustrated in figure E-3, where failure of RC 8A isolates
SDP 4B and SDP 5B from the rest of the network.
SDP 6A and 9B were interchanged to simplify the model
by making it consistent with respect to primary and
backup placement. SDP 10 and 8 were also removed
under the assumption that their function is not critical to
this analysis. We have insufficient detail regarding the
architecture of DMS RC to understand how possible
failures might impact the network. This does not mean
that the DMS is failure tolerant to this mode of failure,
however, there will always exist a second processor on
the network that can take over the tasks if the processors
isolated are primary processors. In figure E-3, the
processors that are isolated as a result of the failure of
RC 8 are both backup processors. When primary proces-
sors are isolated, a smooth transition to the backup
processors is essential for uninterrupted service. Scenar-
ios such as this should be run on test beds to determine
the sensitivity of the system to various types of both
transient and permanent failures. Most safety critical
systems in the past have relied upon triple-modular-
redundancy, further emphasizing the need for test-
bedding this unique configuration as early as possible.
This example illustrates the straightforward process of
redundancy analysis. Of course, the simplicity of this
model is not indicative of the models that will result
when more components (such as local buses and MDMs)
are included in the analysis. Larger models are not solv-
able by inspection as illustrated here. Instead, the DMA
tool should be employed to find all single and double
points of failure.
E.3.3. Reliability analysis of the token ring network-
A reliability analysis was performed on the token ring
configuration shown in figure E-1. At this point in the
design of the DMS, reliability analyses serve only as a
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6A
Figure E-3. Reconfiguration example for site 8 failure.
means of comparing different designs. The absolute
results are meaningless since quite a few assumptions
should be made, however, the relative values resulting
from varying the initial assumptions are informative. The
assumptions used in the analysis are summarized below:
1. Failure rates:
• Processor failure rates are 114.16 per million hours
(MTBF = 1 year).
• RC failure rates are 57.08 per million hours
(MTBF = 2 years).
2. Recovery model for processors:
• 90% of all failures are transient, with 96% of the
transients detected, and recovery time is uniformly
distributed between 0 and 1 sec.
• 10% of failures are permanent, with 96% of the
permanents detected, and a constant recovery time
(reboot time) of 1 min.
• 4% of all failures are undetected and cause
immediate unit failure.
3. Recovery model for RCs:
• All failures are permanent and take 5 sec for
recovery, and recovery is always successful.
4. If node types 3 and 4 have nearly simultaneous
failures (i.e., if a second node of type 3 or 4 fails during
recovery from a first fault), the system fails (near-
coincident failures). This is because nodes 3 and 4
provide electrical power.
5. The mission length is 100 hours (this shortens the
computation time required to solve the models). This
causes the system unreliability to be higher than what
will be expected for mission durations of years, however,
the relative differences are comparable.
For the network configuration shown in figure E-1
(excluding SDP 8 and SDP 10), with RCs at each station
that connect to one direction of the fiber, and assuming
hot backups, the system unreliability is 0.031. If the two
RCs at each station are replaced with one that is con-
nected to both directions of the fiber, the unreliability is
reduced to 0.019. Notice that in figure E-l, the primary
and backup processors for nodes 6 and 9 are each on the
same RC (RC 6 for nodes 6A and 6B, and RC 7 for
nodes 9A and 9B). If nodes 6A and 9B are interchanged,
assuming hot backups and one RC at each station, the
system unreliability is 0.008016. Taking this last con-
figuration and making the backups cold spares instead of
hot, the system unreliability is 0.004338. Summarizing
these results: for the configuration in figure E-l, the
system is 50% less reliable if the RCs are connected to
one direction of the fiber; for the configuration shown in
figure E-3, with RCs connected to both directions of the
fiber, the system is roughly twice as reliable if the back-
ups are powered off (cold) than if they are kept powered
on (hot).
These results illustrate the types of trade-off studies that
can be performed early in the design of a system to
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analyzetheperformanceof different system configura-
tions and parameter values under failure conditions. It is
important that these results be compared to actual test-
bed experiments in order to validate the models and
revise assumptions to more accurately predict the actual
system behavior.
F. Acronyms
A&R
AANMS
AC
ACD
AMD
ANSI
APAE
APP
ARC
ASIC
AT&T
BCU
BIA
biCMOS
BIU
BNIU
BSP
CDR
CEI
CHeCS
CHRPS
CISC
CMOS
COTS
CPU
CR
automation and robotics
Advanced Automation Network Monitor-
ing System
Assembly Complete
Architecture Control Document
Advanced Micro Devices
American National Standards Institute
attached payload accommodation
equipment
application
Ames Research Center
application specific integrated circuit
American Telephone & Telegraph
Bus Control Unit
Bus Interface Adapter
bipolar complementary metal oxide semi-
conductor
bus interface unit
bus network interface unit
baseband signal processor
Critical Design Review
Contract End Item
Crew Health Care Systems
configurable high rate processing system
complex instruction set computer
Complementary Metal Oxide
Semiconductor
commercial, off-the-shelf
central processing unit
Change Request
CRISP
CSA
CSCI
CTS
C&T
DARPA
DFRF
DMA
DMS
DoD
DoE
DPNS
DSAR
ECL
ECLSS
EDAC
EDP
EEPROM
EISA
EMADS
EMTT
EPS
ESA
EVA
F/C
FDDI
FDIR
FEU
FMEA
FMS
FT/RM
FTS
complexity-reduced instruction set
processors
Canadian Space Agency
computer software configuration items
Communications and Tracking System
communications and tracking
Defense Advanced Research Project
Agency
Ames/Dryden Flight Research Facility
Digraph Matrix Analysis
Data Management System
Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Distributed Processing Network Simulator
data storage and retrieval
emitter-coupled logic
Environmental Control and Life Support
System
error detection and correction
embedded data processor
electronically erasable programmable read
only memory
Extended Industry Standard Architecture
Emergency Monitor and Distribution
System
external maintenance task team
Electrical Power System
European Space Agency
extravehicular activities
Firmware Controller
fiber distributed data interface
fault detection, isolation, and recovery
Functional Equivalent Unit
failure modes and effects analysis
Fluid Management System
failure tolerance and redundancy
management
Flight Telerobotic Servicer
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GaAs
GN&C
GPC
GSFC
GW
HAB
HEMT
HPPI
HRL
HSTA
IBM
IEEE
I/O
IOCU
IPI
ISA
ISES
ISO
IrA
ITCS
IT&V
IVA
JEM
JSC
kbps
LAN
LANES
LaRC
LynxOS
Mbps
MB
MDM
MDSSC
MILSPEC
MIPS
Gallium Arsenide M/PS*
Guidance, Navigation, and Control System
General Purpose Computer MISC
Goddard Space Flight Center MMU
gateway MODB
habitat MPAC
high electron mobility transfer MPAC-C
high performance peripheral interface MPAC-F
high-rate links MPAC-O
MSD
Harris System Testability Analyzer
International Business Machines MSU
Institute of Electrical and Electronics MT
Engineers NGCR
inputs and outputs NIA
I/O control unit NIU
Intelligent Peripheral interface NMOS
instruction set architecture NOS
Information Sciences Experiment System OMA
International Standards Organization OMS
Integrated Truss Assembly ORU
internal thermal control system OS
Integrated Test and Verification OSI
intravehicular activity PDR
Japanese experiment module PDU
Johnson Space Center P/L
kiiobit per second = 103 bits per second PMAD
local area network PMC
Local Area Network Extensible Simulator POSIX
Langley Research Center
Lynx real-time operating system PRD
PWR
megabit per second = 106 bits per second
megabyte RAM
multiplexer-demultiplexer RC
RF
McDonnell Douglas Space Systems
Company RID
military specification RISC
million instructions per second RODB
Microprocessor without Interlocked
Pipeline Stages
medium instruction set computers
memory management unit
master object data base
multi-purpose application console
multi-purpose application console---cupola
multi-purpose application consolewfixed
multi-purpose application console--orbiter
mass storage disk
mass storage unit
mobile transporter or man tended
Next Generation Computer Resource
network interface adapter
network interface unit
N-Metal Oxide Semiconductor
network operating system
Operations Management Application
Operations Management System
orbital replaceable units
operating system
Open Systems Interconnection
Preliminary Design Review
Protocol Data Unit
payload
Power Management and Distribution
Permanent Manned Configuration
Portable Operating System Interface for
Computer Environments
Program Requirements Document
power
random access memory
ring concentrator
radio frequency
review item disposition
reduced instruction set computer
runtime object database
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ROM
RPC
RTE
SATWG
SCSI
SDIO
SDP
SEI
SEU
SM
SMD
SOS
SPARC
SPAWAR
SRA.M
SRS
read-only memory
remote procedure call
runtime environment
Strategic Avionics Technology Working
Group
small computer system interface
Strategic Defense Initiative Office
standard data processor
Space Exploration Initiative
single event upset
System Management
storage module device
silicon on sapphire
Scalable Processor Architecture
Space and Naval Warfare Program
static random-access memory
Software Requirements Specification
SSF
SSIS
SSMB
STSV
TCP/IP
TCS
TDB
TDRSS
TGU
UAS
USE
V&V
WAN
WP-2
XTP
ZOE
Space Station Freedom
Space Station Information System
space station manned base
Standard Services
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet
Protocol
Thermal Control System
Time Distribution Bus
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System
Time Generation Unit
user application software
User Support Environment
Verification and Validation
wide-area network
Work Package-2
eXpress Transfer Protocol
zone of exclusion
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